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Abstract
The development of this master thesis aims at verifying various existing secu-
rity protocols using an advanced automated protocol verification tool, namely
the Maude-NPA tool developed by Santiago Escobar (Universitat Polite`cnica de
Vale`ncia) in collaboration with Jose´ Meseguer (University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, USA) and Catherine Meadows (Naval Research Laboratory, Wash-
ington, DC, USA). We focus on protocols using exclusive-or as the only crypto-
graphic properties of symbols, apart of the standard cancellation of encryption
and decryption. The protocols analyzed in this document are borrowed from
the paper “Reducing Protocol Analysis with XOR to the XOR-Free Case in
the Horn Theory Based Approach” by Ralf Ku¨esters and Tomasz Truderung
published in the Journal of Automated Reasoning, volume 46, pages 325-352,
Springer 2011. These protocols are divided into two groups, those that can be
specified in the Alice-Bob notation and those corresponding to an Application
Programming Interface (API). We have proved the same security properties de-
scribed in Ku¨esters and Truderung paper, but we go beyond that paper in the
sense that we have provided protocol specifications that meet all the require-
ments of the original protocols, whereas Ku¨esters and Truderung paper uses
simplified versions of these protocols without exclusive-or properties.
The main problem that we have encountered is to specify API protocols
in Maude-NPA, since this was the first time that this kind of protocols were
specified in the tool. A relevant contribution of this thesis is to confirm that
complex protocols with exclusive-or can be verified in Maude-NPA.
1

Chapter 1
Introduction
The Maude-NPA is a tool and inference system for reasoning about the security
of cryptographic protocols in which the cryptosystems satisfy different equa-
tional properties. The tool handles searches in the unbounded session model,
and thus can be used to provide proofs of security as well as to search for at-
tacks. It is the next generation of the NRL Protocol Analyzer [Meadows 96], a
tool that supported limited equational reasoning and was successfully applied
to the analysis of many different protocols.
The area of formal analysis of cryptographic protocols has been an active one
since the mid 1980s. The idea is to verify protocols that use encryption to guar-
antee secrecy, and that use authentication of data to ensure security, against
an attacker (commonly called the Dolev-Yao attacker [Dolev 83]) who has com-
plete control of the network, and can intercept, alter, and redirect traffic, create
new traffic on his/her own, perform all operations available to legitimate partic-
ipants, and may have access to some subset of the longterm keys of legitimate
principals. Whatever approach is taken, the use of formal methods has had a
long history, not only for providing formal proofs of security, but also for uncov-
ering bugs and security flaws that in some cases had remained unknown long
after the original protocol’s publication.
A number of approaches have been taken to the formal verification of crypto-
graphic protocols. One of the most popular is model checking, in which the inter-
action of the protocol with the attacker is symbolically executed. Indeed, model-
checking of secrecy (and later, authentication) in protocols in the bounded-
session model (where a session is a single execution of a process representing an
honest principal) has been shown to be decidable [Rusinowitch 01], and a num-
3
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ber of bounded-session model checkers exist. Moreover, a number of unbounded
model checkers either make use of abstraction to enforce decidability, or al-
low for the possibility of non-termination. The earliest protocol analysis tools,
such as the Interrogator [Millen 87] and the NRL Protocol Analyzer (NPA)
[Meadows 96] while not strictly speaking model checkers, relied on state explo-
ration, and, in the case of NPA, could be used to verify security properties spec-
ified in a temporal logic language. Later, researchers used generic model check-
ers to analyze protocols, such as FDR [Lowe 96] and later Murphi [Mitchell 97].
More recently the focus has been on special-purpose model-checkers developed
specifically for cryptographic protocol analysis, such as Blanchet’s ProVerif
[Proverif 10], the AVISPA tool [Armando 05], and Maude-NPA itself
[Maude-NPA 09].
There are a number of possible approaches to take in the modeling of crypto
algorithms used. In the simplest case, the free algebra model, crypto systems
are assumed to behave like black boxes: an attacker knows nothing about en-
crypted data unless it has the appropriate key. This is the approach taken,
for example, by the above-cited use of Murphi and FDR to analyze crypto-
graphic protocols, and current tools such as SATMC [Armando 04] and TA4SP
[Boichut 04], both used in the AVISPA tool. However, such an approach, al-
though it can work well for protocols based on generic shared key or public
key cryptography, runs into problems with algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman
or algorithms employing exclusive-or, which rely upon various algebraic proper-
ties such as the law of exponentiation of products, associativity-commutativity
and cancellation. Without the ability to specify these properties, one needs to
rely on approximations of the algorithms that may result in formal proofs of
secrecy invalidated by actual attacks that are missed by the analysis (see, e.g.,
[Paulson 98, Ryan 98, Stubblebine 00]). Thus there has been considerable in-
terest in developing algorithms and tools for protocol analysis in the presence of
algebraic theories [Abadi 06, Baudet 09, Bursuc 09, Chevalier 08, Ciobaˆca 09].
Another way in which tools can differ is in the number of sessions. A session
is defined to be one execution of a protocol role by a single principal. A tool
is said to use the bounded session model if the user must specify the maxi-
mum number of sessions that can be generated in a search. It is said to use
the unbounded session model if no such restrictions are required. Secrecy is
known to be decidable in the free theory together with the bounded session
model [Rusinowitch 01], and undecidable in the free theory together with the
unbounded session model [Durgin 04]. The same distinction between bounded
4
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and unbounded sessions is known to hold for a number of different equational
theories of interest, as well as for some authentication-related properties; see
for example [Bursuc 09, Chevalier 08]. Thus, it is no surprise that most tools,
whether or not they offer support for different algebraic theories, either operate
in the bounded session model, or rely on abstractions that may result in reports
of false attacks even when the protocol being analyzed is secure. Maude-NPA
is a model-checker for cryptographic protocol analysis that both allows for the
incorporation of different equational theories and operates in the unbounded
session model without the use of abstraction. This means that the analysis is
exact. That is, (i) if an attack exists using the specified algebraic properties, it
will be found; (ii) no false attacks will be reported; and (iii) if the tool termi-
nates without finding an attack, this provides a formal proof that the protocol
is secure for that attack modulo the specified properties. However, it is always
possible that the tool will not terminate. Maude-NPA is a backwards search
tool, i.e., it searches backwards from a final insecure state to determine whether
or not it is reachable from an initial state. This backwards search is symbolic,
i.e., it does not start with a concrete attack state, but uses instead a symbolic
attack pattern, i.e., a term with logical variables describing a general attack
situation. The backwards search is then performed by backwards narrowing.
Each backwards narrowing step denotes a state transition, such as a princi-
pal sending or receiving a message or the intruder manipulating a message, all
in a backwards sense. Each backwards narrowing step takes a symbolic state
(i.e., a term with logical variables) and returns a previous symbolic state in
the protocol (again a term with logical variables). In performing a backwards
narrowing step, the variables of the input term are appropriately instantiated
in order to apply the concrete state transition, and the new previous state may
contain new variables that are differentiated from any previously used variable
to avoid confusion. To appropriately instantiate the input term, narrowing uses
equational unification. As it is well-known from logic programming and auto-
mated deduction (see, e.g., [5]), unification is the process of solving equations
t = t’. Standard unification solves these equations in a term algebra. Instead,
equational unification (w.r.t. an equational theory E) solves an equation t =
t’ in a free algebra for the equations E, i.e., modulo the equational theory E.
In the Maude-NPA, the equational theory E used depends on the protocol,
and corresponds to the algebraic properties of the cryptographic functions (e.g.
cancellation of encryption and decryption, Diffie-Hellman, or exclusive-or).
In this thesis we focus in protocols with one exclusive-or operator. Exclusive-
5
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or (XOR) is a binary operator with typical algebraic properties that has drawn
a lot of interest. For example, XOR is often used in radio frequency identifica-
tion (RFID) systems, which have become popular in recent years. The chosen
exclusive-or operator (for example *)has the following four properties, where
symbol 0 can also be chosen by the protocol user:
x * (y * z) = (x * y) * z : (associativity)
x * y = y * x : (commutativity)
x * 0 = x : (neutral element)
x * x = 0 : (nilpotence)
We work with different XOR protocols (see Section 4), and in order to detect
attacks on XOR-protocols, we need to model not only the actions of the pro-
tocol but also the intruder actions to denote the ability of exploring the above
algebraic properties, in addition to the perfect cryptography assumption.
In this thesis we also work with Application Program Interfaces (see Section
5). For this thesis we work with the IBM 4758 Common Cryptographic Architec-
ture API (CCA-API), where XOR is used extensively. In an attack discovered
by Bond [Bond 01] the self-inverse property of XOR can be exploited, together
with some other coincidences in the API transaction set, to reveal a customer’s
PIN. However, the combinatorial possibilities caused by the associative, commu-
tative and self-inverse properties of XOR pose a significant challenge to formal
analysis. We show in Section 5 how the Maude-NPA tool works with these set
of protocols (the original CCA-0 protocol, and the different variants due to the
recommendations of IBM) .
In the following table we can see a summary of the results of the different
protocols that we use in this thesis comparing our results with the results of
the reference paper. In it we can see first the name of the protocol, then if it is
secure according to the analysis of Ku¨esters and Truderung and in our analysis
in the next column. After that, we show if the tool reached a finite space of
solutions or not, the number of states that the tool obtains and finally the depth
of the search space. We should note that we tested two different versions of some
protocols because we specify the original and a modified version of the protocol,
instead of one only modified version of the original protocol as they did in the
paper of reference because they can not handle the entire exclusive-or theory.
6
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Protocol Secure Our
Analysis
Finite
Space
States Depth
XOR-NSL No No Yes 459 7
XOR-NSL-Fix Yes Yes Yes 9 5
RA No No Yes 120 8
RA-Fix Yes Yes Yes 307 26
Shoup-Rubin Yes Yes Yes 365 17
SK3 Yes Yes Yes 3 3
CCA-0 No No Yes 37∗ 6
CCA-0-Ku¨esters No No Yes 2495 6
CCA-1A Yes Yes Yes 21∗ 5
CCA-1B Yes Yes Yes 46∗ 6
CCA-1B-Ku¨esters Yes Yes Yes 1 2
CCA-2B Yes Yes Yes 50∗ 11
CCA-2C Yes Yes No 131∗ 7
CCA-2C-Ku¨esters Yes Yes No 105 4
CCA-2E Yes Yes No 385∗ 7
* This protocol analysis includes Never Patterns
Table 1.1: Experimental results.
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Chapter 2
Background on Term
Rewriting
We follow the classical notation and terminology from [TeReSe 03] for term
rewriting and from [Meseguer 92, Meseguer 98] for rewriting logic and order-
sorted notions. We assume an order-sorted signature Σ with a finite poset of
sorts (S,≤) and a finite number of function symbols. We assume an S-sorted
family X = {Xs}s∈S of disjoint variable sets with each Xs countably infinite.
TΣ(X )s denotes the set of terms of sort s, and TΣ,s the set of ground terms of
sort s. We write TΣ(X ) and TΣ for the corresponding term algebras. We write
Var(t) for the set of variables present in a term t. The set of positions of a term
t is written Pos(t), and the set of non-variable positions PosΣ(t). The subterm
of t at position p is t|p, and t[u]p is the result of replacing t|p by u in t.
A substitution σ is a sort-preserving mapping from a finite subset of X to
TΣ(X ). The identity substitution is id. Substitutions are homomorphically
extended to TΣ(X ). Application of substitution σ to term t is denoted by tσ.
The restriction of σ to a set of variables V is σ|V . The composition of two
substitutions is X(σ ◦ θ) = (Xθ)σ for X ∈ X .
A Σ-equation is an unoriented pair t = t′, where t ∈ TΣ(X )s, t′ ∈ TΣ(X )s′ ,
and s and s′ are sorts in the same connected component of the poset (S,≤).
Given a set E of Σ-equations, order-sorted equational logic induces a congruence
relation =E on terms t, t
′ ∈ TΣ(X ); see [Meseguer 98]. Throughout this paper
we assume that TΣ,s 6= ∅ for every sort s. We denote the E-equivalence class of
a term t ∈ TΣ(X ) as [t]E and the E-equivalence classes of all terms TΣ(X ) and
9
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TΣ(X )s as TΣ/E(X ) and TΣ/E(X )s for a sort s, respectively.
For a set E of Σ-equations, an E-unifier for a Σ-equation t = t′ is a sub-
stitution σ s.t. tσ =E t
′σ. A complete set of E-unifiers of an equation t = t′
is written CSUE(t = t
′). We say CSUE(t = t′) is finitary if it contains a finite
number of E-unifiers.
A rewrite rule is an oriented pair l → r, where l 6∈ X and l, r ∈ TΣ(X )s
for some sort s ∈ S. An (unconditional) order-sorted rewrite theory is a triple
R = (Σ, E,R) with Σ an order-sorted signature, E a set of Σ-equations, and
R a set of rewrite rules. A topmost rewrite theory (Σ, E,R) is a rewrite theory
s.t. for each l → r ∈ R, l, r ∈ TΣ(X )State for a top sort State, r 6∈ X , and no
operator in Σ has State as an argument sort.
The rewriting relation →R on TΣ(X ) is t
p→R t′ (or →R) if p ∈ PosΣ(t),
l→ r ∈ R, t|p = lσ, and t′ = t[rσ]p for some σ. The relation→R/E on TΣ(X ) is
=E ;→R; =E , i.e., t→R/E s iff ∃u1, u2 ∈ TΣ(X ) s.t. t =E u1 →R u2 =E s. Note
that →R/E on TΣ(X ) induces a relation →R/E on TΣ/E(X ) by [t]E →R/E [t′]E
iff t→R/E t′.
When R = (Σ, E,R) is a topmost rewrite theory, we can safely restrict
ourselves to the rewriting relation→R,E on TΣ(X ), where the rewriting relation
→R,E on TΣ(X ) is t
p→R,E t′ (or →R,E) if p ∈ PosΣ(t), l → r ∈ R, t|p =E lσ,
and t′ = t[rσ]p for some σ. Note that →R,E on TΣ(X ) induces a relation →R,E
on TΣ/E(X ) by [t]E →R,E [t′]E iff ∃w ∈ TΣ(X ) s.t. t→R,E w and w =E t′.
The narrowing relation  R on TΣ(X ) is t
p σ,R t′ (or  σ,R,  R) if p ∈
PosΣ(t), l → r ∈ R, σ ∈ CSU∅(t|p = l), and t′ = σ(t[r]p). Assuming that
E has a finitary and complete unification algorithm, the narrowing relation
 R,E on TΣ(X ) is t
p σ,R,E t′ (or  σ,R,E ,  R,E) if p ∈ PosΣ(t), l → r ∈ R,
σ ∈ CSUE(t|p = l), and t′ = σ(t[r]p). In this thesis we consider only equational
theories E = E′unionmultiAx such that the oriented equations E′ are confluent, coherent,
and terminating modulo axioms Ax such as commutativity (C), associativity-
commutativity (AC), or associativity-commutativity plus identity (ACU) of
some function symbols. We also require axioms Ax to be regular, i.e., for each
equation l = r ∈ Ax, Var(l) = Var(r). Note that axioms such as commu-
tativity (C), associativity-commutativity (AC), or associativity-commutativity
plus identity (ACU) are regular. The Maude-NPA has then both dedicated
and generic algorithms for solving unification problems in such theories E′unionmultiAx
under appropriate conditions [Escobar 12].
The use of topmost rewrite theories provides several advantages; see [Thati 07]:
10
(i) as pointed out above the relation →R,E achieves the same effect as the rela-
tion→R/E , and (ii) we obtain a completeness result between narrowing ( R,E)
and rewriting (→R/E), in the sense that a reachability problem has a solution
iff narrowing can find an instance of it.
11
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Chapter 3
Maude-NPA
In this Chapter we briefly present the Maude-NPA cryptographic analyzer tool.
In Chapter 3.1 we present the Maude-NPA’s execution model. After that, in
Chapter 3.2, we show the syntax for protocol specifications in Maude-NPA’s. In
Chapter 3.3 we show how to specify the protocol syntax. Next, in Chapter 3.4
we show how to specify the algebraic properties of the protocol. Also, in Chapter
3.5 we show how to specify the protocol strands. And finally, in Chapter 3.6 we
show how is performed a protocol analysis.
3.1 Maude-NPA’s Execution Model
Given a protocol P, a state in the protocol execution is an EP -equivalence class
[t]EP with t a term of sort State, [t]EP ∈ TΣP/EP (X)State, where ΣP is the sig-
nature defining the sorts and function symbols for the cryptographic functions
and for all the state constructor symbols, and EP is a set of equations specifying
the algebraic properties of the cryptographic functions and the state construc-
tors. A protocol P is specified with a notation derived from strand spaces. In a
strand, a local execution of a protocol by a principal is indicated by a sequence of
messages [msg−1 , msg
+
2 , msg
−
3 , . . . , msg
−
k−1, msg
+
k ] where each msgi is a term
of sort Msg (i.e., msgi ∈ TΣP (X)Msg). Strand items representing input messages
are assigned a negative sign, and strand items representing output messages are
assigned a positive sign. We write m± to denote m+ or m−, indistinctively. We
often write +(m) and −(m) instead of m+ and m−, respectively. For each pos-
itive message msgi in a sequence of messages [msg
±
1 , msg
±
2 , msg
±
3 , . . . , msg
+
i ,
13
CHAPTER 3. MAUDE-NPA
. . . , msg±k−1, msg
±
k ] the non-fresh variables (see below) occurring in an output
messagemsg+i must appear in previous messagesmsg1,msg2,msg3, . . . ,msgi−1.
In Maude-NPA [Escobar 06, Escobar 09c], strands evolve over time and thus
we use the symbol | to divide past and future in a strand, i.e., [nil,msg±1 ,
. . . ,msg±j−1 | msg±j ,msg±j+1, . . . ,msg±k , nil], where msg±1 , . . . ,msg±j−1 are the
past messages, and msg±j ,msg
±
j+1, . . . ,msg
±
k are the future messages (msg
±
j is
the immediate future message). We often remove the nils for clarity, except
when there is nothing else between the vertical bar and the beginning or end of
a strand. We write P for the set of strands in a protocol, including the strands
that describe the intruder’s behavior.
Maude-NPA uses a special sort Msg of messages that allows the protocol
specifier to describe other sorts as subsorts of the top sort Msg. The speci-
fier can make use of a special sort Fresh in the protocol-specific signature Σ
for representing fresh unguessable values, e.g., nonces. We make explicit the
Fresh variables r1, . . . , rk (k ≥ 0) generated by a strand by writing
:: r1, . . . , rk :: [msg
±
1 , . . . ,msg
±
n ], where r1, . . . , rk appear somewhere in
msg±1 , . . . ,msg
±
n . Fresh variables generated by a strand are unique to that strand.
To illustrate this we use the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL)
protocol [Lowe 96]. We reproduce the NSL protocol in the following.
1. A→ B : {NA, A}pk(B)
2. B → A : {NA, NB , B}pk(A)
3. A→ B : {NB}pk(B)
where {M}pk(A) means message M encrypted using the public key of principal
with name A, NA and NB are nonces generated by the respective principals,
and we use the comma as message concatenation.
The specification of the strands of the participants is as follows:
:: r :: [(pk(B,n(A, r);A))
+
, (pk(A,n(A, r);NB;B))
−
, (pk(B,NB))
+
]
:: r’ :: [(pk(B,NA;A))
−
, (pk(A,NA;n(B, r′);B))+, (pk(B,n(B, r′)))−]
A state is a set of Maude-NPA strands unioned together by an associative
and commutativity union operator & with identity operator ∅, along with an
additional term describing the intruder knowledge at that point. The intruder
knowledge is represented as a set of facts unioned together with an associative
and commutativity union operator _,_ with identity operator ∅. There are two
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kinds of intruder facts: positive knowledge facts (the intruder knows message
m, i.e., m∈I), and negative knowledge facts (the intruder does not yet know m
but will know it in a future state, denoted by m/∈I).
When new strands are not introduced into the state, the rewrite rules RP
obtained from the protocol strands P are as follows1, where L,L′ are variables
of the sort for lists of input and output messages (+m,−m), IK is a variable of
the sort for sets of intruder facts (m∈I,m/∈I), SS is a variable of the sort for
sets of strands, and M is a variable of sort Msg:
SS & [L | M−, L′] & (M∈I, IK)→ SS & [L,M− | L′] & (M∈I, IK) (3.1)
SS & [L | M+, L′] & IK → SS & [L,M+ | L′] & IK (3.2)
SS & [L | M+, L′] & (M/∈I, IK)→ SS & [L,M+ | L′] & (M∈I, IK) (3.3)
In a forward execution of the protocol strands, Rule (3.1) synchronizes an
input message with a message already in the channel (i.e., learned by the in-
truder), Rule (3.2) accepts output messages but the intruder’s knowledge is not
increased, and Rule (3.3) accepts output messages and the intruder’s knowledge
is positively increased. Note that Rule (3.3) makes explicit when the intruder
learned a message M , which is recorded in the previous state by the negative
fact M/∈I. A fact M/∈I can be paraphrased as: “the intruder does not yet know
M , but will learn it in the future”.
New strands are added to the state by explicit introduction through dedi-
cated rewrite rules (one for each honest or intruder strand). It is also the case
that when we are performing a backwards search, only the strands that we are
searching for are listed explicitly, and extra strands necessary to reach an initial
state are dynamically added. Thus, when we want to introduce new strands
into the explicit description of the state, we need to describe additional rules
for doing that, as follows:
for each [ l1, u
+, l2 ] ∈ P : SS & [ l1 | u+, l2 ] & (u/∈I, IK)→ SS &(u∈I, IK)
(3.4)
where u denotes a message, l1, l2 denote lists of input and output messages
(+m,−m), IK denotes a variable of the sort for sets of intruder facts (m∈I,m/∈I),
1To simplify the exposition we omit the fresh variables at the beginning of each strand in
a rewrite rule.
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and SS denotes a variable of the sort for sets of strands. For example, intruder
concatenation of two learned messages is described as follows:
SS & [M−1 ,M
−
2 | (M1;M2)+] & ((M1;M2)/∈I, IK)→ SS & ((M1;M2)∈I, IK)
In summary, for a protocol P, the set of rewrite rules obtained from the protocol
strands that are used for backwards narrowing reachability analysis modulo the
equational properties EP is RP = {(3.1), (3.2), (3.3)} ∪ (3.4).
3.2 Syntax for Protocol Specification
In this Chapter, we briefly describe how to specify a protocol and all its relevant
items in the current version of the Maude-NPA. For further information we refer
the reader to [Escobar 09b]. Note that, since we are using Maude also as the
specification language, each declaration has to be ended by a space and a period.
3.2.1 Specifying the Protocol Syntax
We begin by specifying sorts. In general, sorts are used to specify different types
of data, that are used for different purposes. The Maude-NPA tool always as-
sumes that the sort Msg is the top sort, but it allows user-defined subsorts of Msg
that can be specified by the user for a more accurate protocol specification and
analysis. To illustrate the definition of sorts, we use the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe (NSL) [Lowe 96]. For this protocol we need to define sorts to distinguish
names, nonces and encrypted data. This is specified as follows:
sorts Name Nonce Enc .
subsort Name Nonce Enc < Msg .
subsort Name < Public .
We can now specify the different operators needed in NSL. A nonce gener-
ated by principal A is denoted by n(A, r), where r is a unique variable of sort
Fresh. Concatenation of two messages, e.g., NA and NB , is denoted by the
operator ; , e.g., n(A, r);n(B, r′). Encryption of a message M with the public
key KA of principal A is denoted by pk(A,M), e.g., {NB}pk(B) is denoted by
pk(B,n(B, r′)). Encryption with a secret key is denoted by sk(A,M). We begin
with the public/private encryption operators.
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op pk : Name Msg -> Enc .
op sk : Name Msg -> Enc .
Next we specify some principal names. For NSL, we have three constants
of sort Name, a (for Alice), b (for Bob) and i (for the Intruder). We need two
more operators, one for nonces and one for concatenation. The nonce operator
is specified as follows.
op n : Name Fresh -> Nonce .
Note that the nonce operator has an argument of sort Fresh to ensure
uniqueness. The argument of type Name is not strictly necessary, but it pro-
vides a convenient way of identifying which nonces are generated by which
principal. This makes searches more efficient, since it allows us to keep track of
the originator of a nonce throughout a search. Finally, we come to the message
concatenation operator. In Maude-NPA, we specify concatenation via an infix
operator ; defined as follows:
op _ ; _ : Msg Msg -> Msg [gather (e E)] .
Note that the gathering pattern of an operator [Maude 09] restricts the
precedences of terms that are allowed as arguments. We give a (non-empty)
sequence of as many E, e, or & values as the number of arguments in the oper-
ator, that is, one of these values for each argument position:
− E indicates that the argument must have a precedence value lower or equal
than the precedence value of the operator,
− e indicates that the argument must have a precedence value strictly lower
than the precedence value of the operatorand
− & indicates that the operator allows any precedence value for the corre-
sponding argument. In fact, the precedence values work because of their
combination with the gathering patterns.
3.2.2 Algebraic Properties
Next, we specify the algebraic properties of the symbols defined above for the
NSL protocol. There are three types of algebraic properties in Maude-NPA:
(i) equational axioms, such as commutativity, or associativity-commutativity,
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called axiomsand (ii) equational rules, called variant equations, and (iii) equa-
tional rules for dedicated unification algorithms, called dedicated equations .
Variant and dedicated equations are specified in the PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-
ALGEBRAIC module, whereas axioms are specified within the operator dec-
larations in the PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-SYMBOLS module, as illustrated in
what follows. Note that combinations of all three different types of algebraic
properties will be available in the future but in the current version only axioms
and variant equations can be combined.
An equation is oriented into a rewrite rule in which the lefthand side of
the equation is reduced to the righthand side. In NSL, we use two equations
specifying the relationship between public and private key encryption, as follows:
var X : Msg . var A : Name .
eq pk(A,sk(A,X)) = X [variant] .
eq sk(A,pk(A,X)) = X [variant] .
Note that there are restrictions on the equations that can be included here,
since the narrowing-based unification algorithm provided by the tool for those
equations must be finitary, see [Escobar 09b]. For instance, the algebraic prop-
erties of exclusive-or symbol are specified as follows:
eq X * X * Y = Y [variant] .
eq X * X = null [variant] .
eq X * null = X [variant] .
Note that the redundant equational property X * X * Y = Y is necessary
in Maude-NPA for coherence purposes; see [Escobar 09a].
3.2.3 Specifying the Strands
As explained in previous sections, the protocol itself and the intruder capabilities
are both specified using strands. We use the keyword STRANDS-PROTOCOL for
storing the principal strands. For example, the strands associated to the NSL
protocol are specified as follows:
eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL =
:: r ::
[nil | +(pk(B,n(A,r) ; A)),
-(pk(A,n(A,r) ; NB ; B)),
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+(pk(B,NB)), nil]
&
:: r ::
[nil | -(pk(B,NA ; A)),
+(pk(A,NA ; n(B,r) ; B)),
-(pk(B,n(B,r))), nil] .
[nonexec] .
The next thing to specify is the actions of the intruder, or Dolev-Yao rules
[Dolev 83]. These specify the operations an intruder can perform. Each such
action can be specified by an intruder strand consisting of a sequence of negative
nodes, followed by a single positive node. If the intruder can (nondeterminis-
tically) find more than one term as a result of performing one operation (as in
deconcatenation), we specify each of these outcomes by separate strands. Every
operation that can be performed by the intruderand every term that is initially
known by the intruder, should have a corresponding intruder strand. For each
operation used in the protocol we should consider whether or not the intruder
can perform itand specify a corresponding intruder strand that describes the
conditions under which the intruder can perform it. For the NSL protocol, we
have four operations: encryption with a public key (pk), decryption with a pri-
vate key (sk), concatenation ( ; ) and deconcatenation. We use the keyword
STRANDS-DOLEVYAO for storing the intruder strands:
eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO
= :: nil :: [ nil | -(X), -(Y), +(X ; Y), nil] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X ; Y), +(X), nil] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X ; Y), +(Y), nil] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X), +(sk(i,X)), nil] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X), +(pk(Ke,X)), nil]
[nonexec] .
3.3 Protocol Analysis
Next, we describe how to analyze a protocol in practice. First, we explain how
a protocol state looks like and how an attack state is specified in the protocol.
Then, we explain how the protocol analysis is performed.
In Maude-NPA, each state associated to the protocol execution (i.e., a back-
wards search) is represented by a term with five different components separated
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by the symbol || in the following order: (1) the set of current strands, (2) the
current intruder knowledge, (3) the sequence of messages encountered so far in
the backwards execution, (4) some auxiliary data and (5) the never pattern, a
technique to reduce the search space, associated to that state, i.e., a term of the
following form.
Strands || Intruder Knowledge ||Message Sequence || Auxiliary Data || Never Pattern.
The first component, the set of current strands, indicates in particular how ad-
vanced each strand is in the execution process (by the placement of the bar).
The second component contains messages that the intruder already knows (we
use symbol inI for the notation m∈ I)) and messages that the intruder cur-
rently doesnt know (we use symbol inI for the notation m/∈ I)) but will learn
in the future. The third and fourth components are irrelevant for the purposes
of this work, see [Escobar 09b]. The fifth component is used to specify negative
conditions on terms or strands. Never patterns can also be used to cut down
the search space (see [Escobar 09c] for more details).
An initial state is the final result of the backwards reachability process and
is described as follows:
1. in an initial state, all strands have the bar at the beginning, i.e., all strands
are of the form :: r1, .., rj :: [nil | m±1 , ..m±k ];
2. in an initial state, all the intruder knowledge is negative, i.e., all the items
in the intruder knowledge are of the form m/∈ I.
From an initial state, no further backwards reachability steps are possible.
Attack states describe not just single concrete attacks, but attack patterns (or
if you prefer attack situations), which are specified symbolically as terms (with
variables) whose instances are the final attack states we are looking for. Given
an attack pattern, Maude-NPA tries to either find an instance of the attack or
prove that no instance of such attack pattern is possible. We can specify more
than one attack state. Thus, we designate each attack state with a natural
number.
When specifying an attack state, the user should specify only the first two
components of the attack state: (i) a set of strands expected to appear in
the attack and (ii) some positive intruder knowledge. The message sequence,
auxiliary data components and never pattern should have just the empty symbol
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nil. Note that the attack state is indeed a term with variables but the user does
not have to provide the variables denoting the remaining strands, the remaining
intruder knowledge and the two variables for the two last state components.
These variables are symbolically inserted by the tool.
For example, to prove that the NSL protocol fixes the bug found in the
Needham-Schroeder Public Key protocol (NSPK), i.e., the intruder cannot learn
the nonce generated by Bob, we should specify the following attack state:
eq ATTACK-STATE(0) =
:: r ::
[nil, -(pk(b,a ; NA)),
+(pk(a,NA ; n(b,r) ; b)),
-(pk(b,n(b,r))) | nil]
|| n(b,r) inI
|| nil
|| nil
|| nil .
[nonexec] .
And the search space associated to this protocol is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 4 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 7 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 6 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 2 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 0 Solutions>> 0
which cannot reach an initial state and has a finite search space, proving it
secure.
Maude-NPA also allows verification of authentication properties by using
never patterns, i.e., the reachability analysis succeeds when none of the states
in the reachability sequence is an instance of the never pattern. Never patterns
can also be used to cut down the search space. Never patterns can share variables
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with the attack pattern in order to have more specific patterns and the vertical
bar is not included in strands of never patterns, since all the combinations
of the vertical bar are taken into account. For instance, we can specify the
following authentication attack pattern for NSL by including Bob’s strand and
adding never patterns for Alice’s strand (note that we have to specify two never
patterns because states may contain always partial strands):
eq ATTACK-STATE(1)
= :: r ::
[ nil, -(pk(b,a ; N)),
+(pk(a, N ; n(b,r))),
-(pk(b,n(b,r))) | nil ]
|| empty
|| nil
|| nil
|| never *** for authentication
(:: r’ ::
[ nil, +(pk(b,a ; N)),
-(pk(a, N ; n(b,r))) | +(pk(b,n(b,r))), nil ]
& S:StrandSet
|| K:IntruderKnowledge)
[nonexec] .
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Protocols with XOR
In this section we describe different protocols in which the main property that
we use is the exclusive-or. To describe these protocols we use the textbook
Alice-and-Bob notation. This notation is a way of expressing a protocol of cor-
respondence between entities of a dynamic system, such as a computer network.
In the context of a formal model, it allows reasoning about the properties of
such a system.
The standard notation consists of a set of principals (traditionally named
Alice, Bob, Charlie, and so on) who wish to communicate. They may have
access to a server S, shared keys K, timestamps T, and can generate nonces N for
authentication purposes.
A simple example might be the following: A → B : {X1}KAB . This states
that Alice intends a message for Bob consisting of a plaintext X1 encrypted
under shared key KAB . Another example might be the following: B → A :
{NB}PKA . This states that Bob intends a message for Alice consisting of a
nonce encrypted using the public key of Alice.
4.1 Needham-Schroeder Protocol with XOR al-
gebraic properties (XOR-NSL)
This protocol is a variant of the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL)
protocol that involves the exclusive-or (XOR) algebraic property, as shown in
[Chevalier 05]. We reproduce the XOR-NSL protocol below, using the textbook
Alice-and-Bob notation.
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1. A → B : {NA,}pk(B)
2. B → A : {NB ,NA* B}pk(A)
3. A → B : {NB}pk(B)
where A, B denote principal names, NA and NB denote nonces generated by
participants, {M}K denotes encryption of message M using key K and * is the
exclusive-or operator. This protocol is insecure; an attack similar to the one
of the standard Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol (NSPK) was found in
[Chevalier 05] exploiting in this case the algebraic properties of the XOR .
The informal description of this attack, is as follows:
1. I(A) → B : {NB ,I}pub(skI(A))
2. B → I(A) : {NA,NB * I(A)}pub(skI)
3. I(A) → B : {NB}pub(skB)
where A,B are principal names, I is the intruder’s name, I(A) is when the
intruder spoofs Alice’s identity, NA, NB are nonces generated by A and Band
skI is the public key of I. As we can see in this description, the intruder spoofs
Alice’s name. Bob thinks that he was talking to Alice and it doesn’t, it was
talking to the intruder.
4.1.1 Symbols
In the following we show how to specify the sorts and symbols for this protocol
in the Maude-NPA’s syntax. More specifically, we need sorts to denote names
and nonces. This is specified as follows:
sorts Name Nonce Null NNSet .
subsort Name Nonce < NNSet < Msg .
subsort Name Null < Public .
We can now specify the different operators needed in XOR-NSL. A nonce gen-
erated by principal A is denoted by n(A, r), where r is a unique variable of
sort Fresh. Concatenation of two messages, e.g., NA and NB , is denoted by
the operator ;, e.g., n(A, r) ; n(B, r′). Encryption of a message M with the
public key of principal A is denoted by pk(A,M), e.g., NBpk(B) is denoted by
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pk(B,n(B, r′)). Encryption with a secret key is denoted by sk(A,M). The
specification of these operators in the Maude-NPA’s syntax is as follows:
op pk : Name Msg -> Msg [frozen].
op sk : Name Msg -> Msg [frozen].
Next, we specify some principal names. For XOR-NSL, we have three constants
of sort Name, a (for Alice), b (for Bob) and i (for the Intruder). We need three
more operators: one for nonces, one for concatenation and one for the XOR.
The nonce operator is specified as follows:
op n : Name Fresh -> Nonce [frozen].
Note that the nonce operator has an argument of sort Fresh to ensure unique-
ness. The argument of type Name is not strictly necessary, but it provides a
convenient way of identifying which nonces are generated by which principal.
This makes searches more efficient, since it allows us to keep track of the origina-
tor of a nonce throughout a search. Finally, message concatenation is specified
in Maude-NPA via the infix operator ( ; ), which is defined as follows:
op _ ; _ : Msg Msg -> Msg [gather (e E) frozen].
Finally we define the characteristics of the XOR operator which is defined to
be used with NNSet type variables. Also we indicate that this operator has the
associative and commutative properties. This operator is specified as follows:
op _ * _ : NNSet NNSet -> NNSet [assoc comm frozen] .
4.1.2 Algebraic Properties
In this section we specify the algebraic properties of the symbols defined above
for the XOR-NSL protocol using equations. In XOR-NSL, we use two equations
specifying the relationship between public and private key encryption, as follows:
var X : Msg . var A : Name .
eq pk(A,sk(A,X)) = X [variant] .
eq sk(A,pk(A,X)) = X [variant] .
The properties of the XOR operator are denoted by the following equations:
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eq X * X * Y = Y [variant] .
eq X * X = null [variant] .
eq X * null = X [variant] .
where X and Y are variables of sort NNSet. Note that the redundant equational
property X * X * Y = Y is necessary in Maude-NPA for coherence purposes;
see [Escobar 09].
4.1.3 Strand specification
In this section we describe the strands denoting the actions of the protocol’s
honest principals and the intruder capabilities. The strands of this protocol are
specified as follows:
eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL
= :: r :: *** Alice ***
[nil | +(pk(B, n(A,r) ; A)),
-(pk(A, NB ; n(A,r) * B)),
+(pk(B, NB)), nil]
&
:: r’ :: *** Bob ***
[nil | +(pk(B, NA ; A)),
-(pk(A, n(B,r’) ; NA * B)),
+(pk(B, n(B,r’))), nil]
where A and B are variables denoting names and NA and NB are variables
denoting nonces of A and B respectively.
The intruder capabilities are specified by the following strands:
eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO
= :: nil :: [ nil | -(X), -(Y), +(X ; Y), nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X ; Y), +(X), nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X ; Y), +(Y), nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(XN), -(YN), +(XN * YN), nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X), +(sk(i,X)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X), +(pk(A,X)), nil ] &
:: r :: [ nil | +(n(i,r)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | +(null), nil ] &
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:: nil :: [ nil | +(A), nil ]
where variables X and Y denote messages, variable A denotes a sort name of
the participant, variables XN and Y N are of sort NNSet. The first strand
denote concatenation of two messages, whereas the second and third strands
denote the ability of deconcatenation. The fourth strand allows the intruder to
perform the XOR. The fifth, sixth and seventh strands denote the ability of the
intruder to perform private encryption and public encryption and to generate
his own nonce, respectively. Finally, the two last strands allow the intruder to
generate the XOR null element and any name, respectively.
4.1.4 Protocol analysis
This protocol is insecure as it shown in [Chevalier 05] since it is subject to
an attack similar to the one of the original NSPK protocol that exploits the
algebraic properties of the XOR.
This attack is found in Maude-NPA by searching backwards from the attack
pattern below:
eq ATTACK-STATE(0)
= :: r’ :: *** Bob ***
[nil, +(pk(b, NA ; a)),
-(pk(a, n(b,r’) ; NA * b)),
+(pk(b, n(b,r’))) | nil]
|| n(b,r’) inI
|| nil
|| nil
|| nil
[nonexec] .
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 20 Solutions>> 0
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reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 48 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 72 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 93 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 110 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 116 Solutions>> 1
For this attack pattern Maude-NPA finds an initial state. The sequence of
exchanged messages of the attack is as follows:
generatedByIntruder(a),
generatedByIntruder(pk(b, (b * i) ; a)),
-(pk(b, (b * i) ; a)),
+(pk(a, n(b, #0:Fresh) ; i)),
-(pk(a, n(b, #0:Fresh) ; i)),
+(pk(i, n(a, #1:Fresh) ; a * n(b, #0:Fresh))),
-(pk(i, n(a, #1:Fresh) ; a * n(b, #0:Fresh))),
+(n(a, #1:Fresh) ; a * n(b, #0:Fresh)),
-(n(a, #1:Fresh) ; a * n(b, #0:Fresh)),
+(a * n(b, #0:Fresh)),
-(a),
-(a * n(b, #0:Fresh)),
+(n(b, #0:Fresh)),
-(n(b, #0:Fresh)),
+(pk(b, n(b, #0:Fresh))),
-(pk(b, n(b, #0:Fresh)))
where generatedByIntruder is produced by the Maude-NPA’s optimization
of the Super Lazy intruder (see [Escobar 14] for details), which means it is a
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message that the intruder can trivially learn,i.e., it is not necessary to find out
how it is generated. In this case, this happens with the name of one of the
participants. After that, the intruder is able to use it with his own name and
the other participant name to make a public encryption and use it in the attack.
4.2 Fixed Needham-Schroeder protocol with XOR
algebraic properties (XOR-NSL-Fix)
Since the Needham-Schroeder Protocol with XOR algebraic properties (XOR-
NSL protocol) of Section 5 has an attack, a fixed version of the protocol (XOR-
NSL-Fix) is proposed in [Ku¨esters 11] in which the message {NB , NA * B}pk(A)
is replaced by {NB ,h(NA, NB) * B}pk(A), using a hash function h(·).
The informal description of the fixed version of the protocol, is as follows:
1. A → B : {NA,A}pk(B)
2. B → A : {NB , h(NA, NB) * B}pk(A)
3. A → B : {NB}pk(B)
where A,B denote principal names, NA and NB denote nonces generated by
participants, {M}K denotes encryption of message M using key K, * is the
exclusive-or operatorand h(M) denotes the hash function over a message M .
This protocol is secure with the fix proposed. This fixed version of the XOR-
NSL protocol is secure against the attack of [Chevalier 05] .
4.2.1 Symbols
All the symbols are the same that for the original version of the protocol except
the one for the hash function. This is specified as follows:
sorts Hash .
subsort Hash < NNSet < Msg .
We can now specify the hash operator as follows:
op h : Msg -> Hash [frozen] .
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4.2.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of the XOR-NSL fixed protocol are the same of the
XOR-NSL protocol, which are specified by the AC property of symbol * and
the equations of Section 4.1.2.
4.2.3 Strand specification
As explained in previous section, the protocol itself and the intruder capabilities
are both specified using strands. The principal strands are as follows:
eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL
= :: r :: *** Alice ***
[nil | +(pk(B, n(A,r) ; A)),
-(pk(A, NB ; h(n(A,r) ; NB) * B)),
+(pk(B, NB)), nil]
&
= :: r’ :: *** Bob ***
[nil | +(pk(B, NA ; A)),
-(pk(A, n(B,r’) ; h(NA ; n(B,r’) * B)),
+(pk(B, n(B,r’))), nil]
[nonexec] .
where A and B are variables denoting names and NA and NB are variables
denoting nonces of A and B respectively. The difference between the specifica-
tion of the fixed version and the original version of this protocol (see 4.1.3) is
that in the original version of the protocol the message “pk(A, NB ; n(A,r)
* B)” is replaced by “pk(A, NB ; h(n(A,r) ; NB) * B)” for Alice’ strand
and “pk(A, n(B,r’) ; NA * B)” is replaced by “pk(A, n(B,r’) ; h(NA ;
n(B,r’) * B)” for Bob’ strand.
The intruder capabilities are specified as in the XOR-NSL protocol in Section
4.1.3, the only difference is the inclusion of the ability of the intruder to apply
the hash function, that is specified as follows:
:: nil :: [ nil | -(XN), +(h(XN)), nil ] &
where XN denotes a sort sort of Msg.
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4.2.4 Protocol analysis
We use an attack pattern similar to the one used in Section 4.1.4. for the original
version of the protocol, to prove wether the fix makes the protocol secure.
eq ATTACK-STATE(0)
= :: r’ :: *** Bob ***
[nil, +(pk(b, NA ; a)),
-(pk(a, n(b,r’) ; h(NA ; n(b,r’) * b)),
+(pk(b, n(b,r’))) | nil]
|| n(b,r’) inI
|| nil
|| nil
|| nil
[nonexec] .
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 3 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 4 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 2 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 4 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 2 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 0 Solutions>> 0
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The protocol is secure with this fix and, when this protocol is analyzed with
Maude-NPA, it generates a finite search state space finding no initial state for
the attack pattern above.
4.3 Bull Recursive Authentication Protocol (RA)
The Bull Recursive Authentication Protocol (RA) [Bull 97, Comon-Lundh 03],
aims at establishing fresh session keys between a fixed number of participants
(for instance 3) and a server: one key for each pair of agents. We reproduce the
RA below, using textbook Alice-and-Bob notation.
A computes XA = h(A,B,NA), (A,B,NA)
1. A → B : XA
B computes XB = h(B,C,NB ,Xa), (B,C,NB ,XA)
2. B → C : XB
C computes XC = h(C,S,NC ,Xb), (C,S,NC ,XB)
3. C → S : XC
4. S → C : KAB * h(NA,KAS),
KAB * h(NB ,KBS),
KBC * h(NB ,KBS),
KBC * h(NC ,KCS)
5. C → B : KAB * h(NA,KAS),
KAB * h(NB ,KBS),
KBC * h(NB ,KBS)
6. B → A : KAB * h(NA,KAS)
where A, B, C, S denotes participants names, NA and NB , NC denotes nonces
generated by participants, KAB and KBC denote session keys between partici-
pants A and B and B and C respectively, KAS , KBS and KCS denote encryption
of principal names using the server’s nonce, and * is the exclusive-or operator.
This protocol is insecure; an attack similar to the one of the standard Need-
ham Schroeder protocol was found in [Chevalier 05] exploiting in this case the
algebraic properties of the XOR .
As we can see in [Comon-Lundh 03] this protocol is subject to an attack
because secrecy of KAB from C fails if the following constraint is satisfiable:
T = {MB , x, y,KAB∗ h(KA, NA),KAB ∗ h(KB , NB),KBC ∗ h(KB , NB),KBC
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∗ h(x, y)} implies KAB , where variables x, y represent terms whose value can
be chosen by C . We guess that x, y are not instantiated and that the sub-
terms are derived in the following order: h(x, y) < KBC < KAB . Observe
that h(x, y) is derivable from T in one step by applying function symbol h
to x and y, KBC is derivable from T ∪ h(x, y) in one step, by (X), KAB is
derivable from T ∪ h(x, y) ∪ KBC in one step, by two application of (X) :
((KAB ∗h(KB , NB)) ∗ ((KBC ∗h(KB , NB)) ∗KBC = KAB . Therefore, after the
second reduction step we obtain an empty constraint, proving that secrecy of
KAB is violated.
The informal description of this attack is as follows:
A computes XA = h(A,B,NA), (A,B,NA)
1. A → B : XA
B computes XB = h(B,C,NB ,Xa), (B,C,NB ,XA)
2. B → C : XB
C computes XC = h(C,S,NC ,Xb), (C,S,NC ,XB)
3. C → S : XC
4. S → C : KAB * h(NA,KAS),
KAB * h(NB ,KBS),
KBC * h(NB ,KBS),
KBC * h(NC ,KCS)
5. C → B : KAB * h(NA,KAS),
KAB * h(NB ,KBS),
KBC * h(NB ,KBS)
6. B → I : KAB , h(NA,KAS)
7. I(B) → A : KAB * h(NA,KAS)
4.3.1 Symbols
The symbols of the Bull Recursive Authentication Protocol (RA) are the same
of the XOR-NSL-Fix protocol, which are specified by the equations of Section
4.2.1.
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4.3.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of the Bull Recursive Authentication Protocol (RA)
are the same of the XOR-NSL protocol, which are specified by AC and the
equations of Section 4.1.2.
4.3.3 Strand specification
In this section we describe the strands denoting the actions of the protocol’s
honest principals and the intruder capabilities. First of all we define different
variables of type Hash that will be used at the protocol specification.
1. HA represents h(A ; B ; NA)
2. HA’ represents h(KA ; NA)
3. HB represents h(B, C ; NB ; (A ; B ; NA ; h(A ; B ; NA)))
4. HB’ represents h(KB , NB)
The strands of this protocol are specified as follows:
eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL =
:: r :: *** Alice ***
[nil | +(A ; B ; n(A,r) ; h(A ; B ; n(A,r))),
-((SK * h(pkey(A,NS) ; n(A,r)))), nil ]
&
:: r :: *** Bob ***
[nil | -(A ; B ; NA ; HA),
+(B ; C ; n(B,r) ; (A ; B ; NA ; HA) ;
h(B ; C ; n(B,r) ; (A ; B ; NA ; HA))),
-((SK * HA’) ;
(SK * h(pkey(B,NS) ; n(B,r))) ;
(SK’ * h(pkey(B,NS) ; n(B,r)))),
+(SK * HA’), nil]
&
:: r :: *** Charlie ***
[nil | -(B ; C ; NB ; (A ; B ; NA ; HA) ; HB),
+(C ; S ; n(C,r) ; (B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ; HA ; HB) ;
h(C ; S ; n(C,r) ; ( B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ; HA ; HB))),
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-(( SK * HA’) ;
(SK * HB’) ;
(SK’ * HB’) ;
(SK’ * h(pkey(C,NS) ; n(C,r)))),
+((SK * HA’) ;
(SK * HB’) ;
(SK’ * HB’)), nil]
&
:: r,r’ :: *** Server ***
[nil | -(C ; S ; NC ; B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ; h(A ; B ; NA) ;
h(B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ; h(A ; B ; NA)) ;
h(C ; S ; NC ; B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ;
h(A ; B ; NA) ; h(B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ; h(A ; B ; NA)))),
+((seskey(A, B, n(s,r)) * h(pkey(A,n(s,r)) ; NA)) ;
(seskey(A, B, n(s,r)) * h(pkey(B,n(s,r)) ; NB)) ;
(seskey(B, C, n(s,r’)) * h(pkey(B,n(s,r)) ; NB)) ;
(seskey(B, C, n(s,r’)) * h(pkey(C,n(s,r)) ; NC))), nil]
where A, B and C are variables denoting names and NA, NB and NC are
variables denoting nonces of A, B and C respectively.
The intruder capabilities are specified by the following strands:
eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO
= :: nil :: [nil | -(X), -(Y), +(X ; Y), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(X ; Y), +(X), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(X ; Y), +(Y), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(XN), -(YN), +(XN * YN), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(XN), +(h(XN)), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(pkey(i,NX)), +(NX), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(NX), +(pkey(A,NX)), nil] &
:: r :: [nil | +(n(i,r)), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | +(null), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | +(A), nil]
[nonexec] .
where variables X and Y denote messages, variable A denotes a sort name of
the participant, variables XN and Y N denote Msg. The first strand denotes
concatenation of two messages, whereas the second and third strands denote the
ability of deconcatenation. The fourth strand allows the intruder to perform the
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XOR. The fifth strand denote the ability of the intruder to generate his own
hash function. The sixth strand allows the intruder to encrypt data with his
public key. The seventh strand allows the intruder to encrypt a message of sort
Msg with any public Key and the eight strand allows the intruder to generate
his own nonce, respectively. Finally, the two last strands allow the intruder to
generate the XOR null element and any name, respectively.
4.3.4 Protocol analysis
This attack is found in Maude-NPA by searching backwards from the attack
pattern below:
eq ATTACK-STATE(0)
= :: r :: *** Alice ***
[nil, +(a ; b ; n(a,r) ; h(a ; b ; n(a,r))),
-(SK * h(pkey(a,NS) ; n(a,r))) | nil]
|| empty
|| nil
|| nil
|| nil
[nonexec] .
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 4 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 8 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 14 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 18 Solutions>> 0
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reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 20 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 24 Solutions>> 1
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(7) .
result Summary: States>> 32 Solutions>> 1
For this attack pattern Maude-NPA finds an initial state as it was expected.
The sequence of exchanged messages of the attack is as follows
+(a ; b ; n(a, #0:Fresh) ; h(a ; b ; n(a, #0:Fresh))),
-(a ; b ; n(a, #0:Fresh) ; h(a ; b ; n(a, #0:Fresh))),
+(b ; n(a, #0:Fresh) ; h(a ; b ; n(a, #0:Fresh))),
-(b ; n(a, #0:Fresh) ; h(a ; b ; n(a, #0:Fresh))),
+(n(a, #0:Fresh) ; h(a ; b ; n(a, #0:Fresh))),
-(n(a, #0:Fresh) ; h(a ; b ; n(a, #0:Fresh))),
+(n(a, #0:Fresh)),
generatedByIntruder(pkey(a, #2:Nonce)),
-(pkey(a, #2:Nonce)),
-(n(a, #0:Fresh)),
+(pkey(a, #2:Nonce) ; n(a, #0:Fresh)),
-(pkey(a, #2:Nonce) ; n(a, #0:Fresh)),
+(h(pkey(a, #2:Nonce) ; n(a, #0:Fresh))),
generatedByIntruder(#1:Sessionkey),
-(#1:Sessionkey),
-(h(pkey(a, #2:Nonce) ; n(a, #0:Fresh))),
+(#1:Sessionkey * h(pkey(a, #2:Nonce) ; n(a, #0:Fresh))),
-(#1:Sessionkey * h(pkey(a, #2:Nonce) ; n(a, #0:Fresh)))
4.4 Bull Recursive Authentication Protocol Fix
(RA-Fix Protocol)
Since the RA of previous section has an attack, a fixed version of the protocol
(RA-Fix) is proposed in [Ku¨esters 11] in which the messageKAB∗h(NA, key(A))
sent by the key distribution server to A is replaced by KAB ∗h(NA, B, key(A)).
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We reproduce the RA-fix protocol below, using textbook Alice-and-Bob notation.
A computes XA = h(A,B,NA), (A,B,NA)
1. A → B : XA
B computes XB = h(B,C,NB ,Xa), (B,C,NB ,XA)
2. B → C : XB
C computes XC = h(C,S,NC ,Xb), (C,S,NC ,XB)
3. C → S : XC
4. S → C : KAB * h(NA,B,KAS),
KAB * h(NB ,KBS),
KBC * h(NB ,KBS),
KBC * h(NC ,KCS)
5. C → B : KAB * h(NA,B,KAS),
KAB * h(NB ,KBS),
KBC * h(NB ,KBS)
6. B → A : KAB * h(NA,B,KAS)
where A, B, C, S denote participants names, NA and NB , NC denote nonces
generated by participants, Kab and Kbc denote session keys between partici-
pants A and B and B and C respectively, KAS ,KBS and KCS denote encryption
of principal names using Server nonce, and * is the exclusive-or operator.
4.4.1 Symbols
The Symbols of the Bull Recursive Authentication Protocol Fix (RA-Fix Pro-
tocol) are the same of the RA, which are specified by the equations of Section
4.3.1.
4.4.2 Algebraic properties
The Algebraic properties of the Bull Recursive Authentication Protocol Fix
(RA-Fix Protocol) are the same of the RA, which are specified by the equations
of Section 4.3.2 .
4.4.3 Strand specification
In this section we describe the strands denoting the actions of the protocol’s
honest principals and the intruder capabilities. First of all we define different
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variables of type Hash that will be used for clarity at the protocol specification.
1. HA represents h(A ; B ; NA)
2. HA’ represents h(NA ; B ; KA)
3. HB represents h(B, C ; NB ; (A ; B ; NA ; h(A ; B ; NA)))
4. HB’ represents h(NB ; KB)
And after that, we show the protocol strands in Maude-NPA:
eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL =
:: r :: *** Alice ***
[nil | +(A ; B ; n(A,r) ; h(A ; B ; n(A,r))),
-((SK * h(pkey(A,NS) ; B ; n(A,r)))), nil ]
&
:: r :: *** Bob ***
[nil | -(A ; B ; NA ; HA),
+(B ; C ; n(B,r) ; (A ; B ; NA ; HA) ;
h(B ; C ; n(B,r) ; (A ; B ; NA ; HA))),
-((SK * HA’) ;
(SK * h(pkey(B,NS) ; n(B,r))) ;
(SK’ * h(pkey(B,NS) ; n(B,r)))),
+(SK * HA’), nil]
&
:: r :: *** Charlie ***
[nil | -(B ; C ; NB ; (A ; B ; NA ; HA) ; HB),
+(C ; S ; n(C,r) ;
(B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ; HA ; HB) ;
h(C ; S ; n(C,r) ;
( B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ; HA ; HB))),
-(SK * HA’) ;
(SK * HB’) ;
(SK’ * HB’) ;
(SK’ * h(pkey(C,NS) ; n(C,r)))),
+(SK * HA’) ;
(SK * HB’) ;
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(SK’ * HB’), nil]
&
:: r,r’ :: *** Server ***
[nil | -(C ; S ; NC ; B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ;
h(A ; B ; NA) ;
h(B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ; h(A ; B ; NA)) ;
h(C ; S ; NC ; B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ;
h(A ; B ; NA) ; h(B ; C ; NB ; A ; B ; NA ;
h(A ; B ; NA)))),
+((seskey(A, B, n(s,r)) * h(pkey(A,n(s,r)) ; B ; NA)) ;
(seskey(A, B, n(s,r)) * h(pkey(B,n(s,r)) ; NB)) ;
(seskey(B, C, n(s,r’)) * h(pkey(B,n(s,r)) ; NB)) ;
(seskey(B, C, n(s,r’)) * h(pkey(C,n(s,r)) ; NC))), nil]
where A, B and C are variables denoting names and NA, NB and NC are
variables denoting nonces of A, B and C respectively. The intruder capabilities
are specified as in the original protocol (see Section 4.3.3).
The difference between the specification of the fixed version and the original
version of this protocol (see 4.3.3) is that in the original version of the pro-
tocol the message “(SK * h(pkey(A,NS) ; n(A,r)))” is replaced by “(SK *
h(pkey(A,NS) ; B ; n(A,r)))” for Alice’ strand and “(seskey(A, B, n(s,r))
* h(pkey(A,n(s,r)) ; NA))” is replaced by “(seskey(A, B, n(s,r)) *
h(pkey(A,n(s,r)) ; B ; NA))” for Server’ strand.
4.4.4 Protocol analysis
We use an attack pattern similar to the one used previously for the original
version of the protocol in Section 4.3.4, to prove if the fix makes the protocol
secure.
eq ATTACK-STATE(0)
= :: r :: *** Alice ***
[nil, +(a ; b ; n(a,r) ; h(a ; b ; n(a,r))),
-(SK * h(pkey(a,NS) ; n(a,r) ; b)) | nil]
|| empty
|| nil
|| nil
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|| nil
[nonexec] .
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 4 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 8 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 11 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 9 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 8 Solutions>> 1
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 10 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(7) .
result Summary: States>> 12 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(8) .
result Summary: States>> 11 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(9) .
result Summary: States>> 12 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(10) .
result Summary: States>> 17 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(11) .
result Summary: States>> 26 Solutions>> 0
41
CHAPTER 4. PROTOCOLS WITH XOR
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(12) .
result Summary: States>> 33 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(13) .
result Summary: States>> 29 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(14) .
result Summary: States>> 18 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 11 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(16) .
result Summary: States>> 8 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(17) .
result Summary: States>> 10 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(18) .
result Summary: States>> 13 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(19) .
result Summary: States>> 14 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(20) .
result Summary: States>> 13 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(21) .
result Summary: States>> 11 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(22) .
result Summary: States>> 9 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(23) .
result Summary: States>> 6 Solutions>> 0
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reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(24) .
result Summary: States>> 3 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(25) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(26) .
result Summary: States>> 0 Solutions>> 0
The protocol is secure with this fix and, when this protocol is analyzed with
Maude-NPA, it generates a finite search state space finding no initial state for
the attack pattern above.
4.5 Shoup-Rubin Protocol
Shoup and Rubin’s contribution is the design of a smart card protocol for
session-key distribution, which is discussed within an extension of the Bellare-
Rogaway’s framework [Bella 03] [Shoup 96]. In the original version of the pro-
tocol, there were five participants of the protocol: Alice, Bob, the Server and
smart cards of Alice and Bob. According to what the protocol says, it is as-
sumed that the communication between smart cards and participants Alice and
Bob is secure and therefore the attacker can not extract anything from that
communication. We have made the following simplifications to this protocol:
− We have removed the strands of smart cards.
− Alice generates its nonce, rather than generate their smart card and send
it to her.
− Bob generates its nonce, rather than generate their smart card and send
it to him.
− Bob generates the session key and sends it to Alice. In the original version
was one of the smart cards who generated it and is sending his honest par-
ticipant and this corresponding forward it to the other honest participant.
We use these aliases to make easy the understanding of the specification:
− SK represents {A,B}NB
− PAB represents KAB ∗ {B}KA
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− KAB represents {A}KB
The specification of this protocol using textbook Alice-and-Bob notation is
as follows:
1. A → S : A, B
2. S → A : PAB , {PAB , B}KA
3. A → B : A, NA
4. B → A : NB , {NA, NB}KAB
5. B → A : {SK}KAB
6. A → B : {NB}KAB
where A,B denote principal names, NA and NB denote nonces generated by
participants, {M}K denotes encryption of message M using key Kand * is the
exclusive-or operator.
We use this attack pattern to check if the session key is secure
eq ATTACK-STATE(0)
= :: r :: *** Bob ***
[nil, -(a ; NCA),
+(n(b,r) ; e(nse(symKey(b), a), NCA ; n(b,r))),
*** Simulation: Bob sends session key to Alice
+(e(nse(symKey(b), a), sesK(n(b,r), a, b))),
-(e(nse(symKey(b), a), n(b,r))) | nil]
|| sesK(n(b,r), a, b) inI
|| nil
|| nil
|| nil
[nonexec] .
As you can see in Section 4.5.4 this protocol is secure.
4.5.1 Symbols
In the following we show how to specify the sorts and symbols for this protocol
in the Maude-NPA’s syntax. More specifically, we need sorts to denote names,
nonces, hash operator and Keys. This is specified as follows:
sorts Name Nonce Symkey Key Sessionkey NSymEnc Null .
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subsort Name Nonce < Msg .
subsort Symkey Sessionkey NSymEnc < Msg .
subsort Name < Public .
subsort Null < NSymEnc .
We can now specify the different operators needed in the Shoup-Rubin pro-
tocol. A nonce generated by principal A is denoted by n(A, r), where r is a
unique variable of sort Fresh. Concatenation of two messages, e.g., NA and
NB , is denoted by the operator “ ; ”, e.g., n(A, r); n(B, r’). Next, we specify
some principal names. For XOR-NSL, we have three constants of sort Name, a
(for Alice), b (for Bob) and i (for the Intruder). We need three more operators:
one for nonces, one for concatenation and one for the XOR. The nonce operator
is specified as follows:
op n : Name Fresh -> Nonce [frozen].
Note that the nonce operator has an argument of sort Fresh to ensure
uniqueness. The argument of type Name is not strictly necessary, but it provides
a convenient way of identifying which nonces are generated by which principal.
This makes searches more efficient, since it allows us to keep track of the orig-
inator of a nonce throughout a search. Message concatenation is specified in
Maude-NPA via the infix operator ; , which is defined as follows:
op _ ; _ : Msg Msg -> Msg [gather(e E) frozen].
Next we define the characteristics of the XOR operator which is defined to
be used with NSymEnc type variables. Also we indicate that this operator has
the associative and commutative properties.
op _*_ : NSymEnc NSymEnc -> NSymEnc [assoc comm frozen] .
Next we define diferents kinds of key generators. First we define the sesK
operator which is defined to be used with the principal names and the nonce of
one of the participants.
op sesK : Nonce Name Name -> Sessionkey [frozen] .
Second we define the symKey operator which is defined to be used with the
participant name.
op symKey : Name -> Symkey [frozen] .
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Also we define the nse operator which is defined as follows:
op nse : Symkey Msg -> NSymEnc [frozen] .
Next we define diferents kinds of encryption and decryption operators. We
define the first encryption and decryption operators which are defined to be
used with an arguments of sort Key and Msg.
op e : Key Msg -> Msg [frozen] .
op d : Key Msg -> Msg [frozen] .
Next we define the second encryption and decryption operators which are
defined to be used with an arguments of sort Symkey and Msg.
op se : Symkey Msg -> Msg [frozen] .
op sd : Symkey Msg -> Msg [frozen] .
Next we define diferents kinds of key generators. We define the first key
generator operator which are defined to be used with the principals names and
the nonce of one of the participants
op sesK : Nonce Name Name -> Sessionkey [frozen] .
Next we define the second key generator operator which are defined to be
used with the participant name .
op symKey : Name -> Symkey [frozen] .
And finally we define the third key generator operator which are defined to
be used with a sort Symkey and the participant name.
op nse : Symkey Name -> NSymEnc [frozen] .
4.5.2 Algebraic properties
In this section we specify the algebraic properties of the symbols defined in the
section 6.5.1, using equations apart of associative, commutative and identity
properties. In Shoup-Rubin protocol, we use two equations specifying the rela-
tionship for each one of the two different types of encryption/decryption that
we use. We specify as follows:
46
4.5. SHOUP-RUBIN PROTOCOL
var NSEnc : NSymEnc . var M : Msg .
eq d(NSEnc, e(NSEnc, M)) = M [variant] .
eq e(NSEnc, d(NSEnc, M)) = M [variant] .
var SKey : Symkey .
eq sd(SKey, se(SKey, M)) = M [variant].
eq se(SKey, sd(SKey, M)) = M [variant].
The properties of the XOR operator are denoted by the following equations:
var NSEnc NSEnc’ : NSymEnc .
eq null * NSEnc = NSEnc [variant] .
eq NSEnc * NSEnc = null [variant] .
eq NSEnc * NSEnc * NSEnc’ = NSEnc’ [variant] .
Note that the redundant equational property of the last equation is necessary
in Maude-NPA for coherence purposes; see [Escobar 09].
4.5.3 Strand specification
In this section we describe the strands denoting the actions of the protocols
honest principals and the intruder capabilities. The strands of this protocol are
specified as follows:
:: r :: *** Alice ***
[nil | +(A ; B),
-((PAB * nse(symKey(A), B)) ;
(se(symKey(A), (PAB * nse(symKey(A), B)) ; B))),
+(A ; n(A,r)),
-(NCB ; e(PAB, n(A,r) ; NCB)),
***Simulation: Bob sends session key to Alice
-(e(PAB, sesK(NCB, A, B))),
+(e(PAB, NCB)), nil]
&
:: r :: *** Bob ***
[nil | -(A ; NCA),
+(n(B,r) ; e(nse(symKey(B), A), NCA ; n(B,r))),
*** Simulation: Bob sends session key to Alice
+(e(nse(symKey(B), A), sesK(n(B,r), A, B))),
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-(e(nse(symKey(B), A), n(B,r))), nil]
&
:: nil :: *** Server ***
[nil | -(A ; B),
+((nse(symKey(B), A) * nse(symKey(A), B)) ;
se(symKey(A),
(nse(symKey(B), A) * nse(symKey(A), B)) ; B)), nil]
where A and B are variables denoting names and NA and NB are variables
denoting nonces of A and B respectively.
The intruder capabilities are specified by the following strands:
eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO
= :: nil ::[nil | -(X), -(Y), +(X ; Y), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(X ; Y), +(X), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(X ; Y), +(Y), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(NSEnc), -(NSEnc’), +(NSEnc * NSEnc’), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(M), -(NSEnc), +(e(NSEnc,M)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(M), -(NSEnc), +(d(NSEnc,M)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(M), -(SK), +(se(SK,M)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(M), -(SK), +(sd(SK,M)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(SK), +(nse(SK, i)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | +(symKey(i)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(N), +(sesK(N,i,A)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(N), +(sesK(N,A,i)), nil ] &
:: r :: [nil | +(n(i,r)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | +(null), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | +(A), nil ]
[nonexec] .
where variables X and Y denote messages, variable A denotes a sort name of
the participant, variable SK denotes Symkey, variable M denotes Msg, variable N
denotes Nonce, and variables NSEnc and NSEnc’ are of sort NSymEnc. The first
strand denote concatenation of two messages, whereas the second and third
strands denote the ability of deconcatenation. The fourth strand allows the
intruder to perform the XOR. The fifth , sixth, seventh and eighth strands
allows the intruder to perform different kinds of encryption and decryption.
The ninth strand denotes the ability of the intruder to generate any kind of nse
encryption with his name. The tenth strand denotes the ability of the intruder
to generate his own symmetric key. The eleventh and twelfth strands denote the
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ability of the intruder of generate a session key. Finally the three last strands
allow the intruder to generate his own nonce, the XOR null element and any
name, respectively.
4.5.4 Protocol analysis
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool is
as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 4 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 12 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 28 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 51 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 74 Solutions>> 1
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 80 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(7) .
result Summary: States>> 70 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(8) .
result Summary: States>> 55 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(9) .
result Summary: States>> 45 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(10) .
result Summary: States>> 46 Solutions>> 0
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reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(11) .
result Summary: States>> 36 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(12) .
result Summary: States>> 43 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(13) .
result Summary: States>> 21 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(14) .
result Summary: States>> 11 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(16) .
result Summary: States>> 0 Solutions>> 0
The protocol is secure against this attack and, when this protocol is analyzed
with Maude-NPA, it generates a finite search state space finding no initial state
for the attack pattern above.
4.6 Symmetric Key distribution protocol using
Smart Cards (SK3)
The Symmetric Key distribution using Smart Cards (SK3) protocol [Bond 01]
is a key distribution protocol for smart cards, which uses the XOR operator.
This protocol is a version of the Shoup-Rubin protocol of the Section 4.5 .
We have specified a simplified version of this protocol. In the original version
of the protocol, there were five participants of the protocol: Alice, Bob, the
Server and the smart cards of Alice and Bob. The informal description of the
protocol in [Bond 01] assumes that the communication between smart cards and
participants Alice and Bob is secure and therefore the attacker can not extract
anything from that communication. We have made the following simplifications
to this protocol:
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− We have removed the strands of smart cards.
− Alice generates its nonce, rather than generate their smart card and send
it to her.
− Bob generates its nonce, rather than generate their smart card and send
it to him.
− Bob generates the session key and sends it to Alice. In the original version
was one of the smart cards who generated it and is sending his honest par-
ticipant and this corresponding forward it to the other honest participant.
We use these aliases to make easier the understanding of the specification:
− SK represents {A,B, 1}NB
− PAB represents KAB * {B, 1}KA
− KAB represents {A, 0}KB
The specification using textbook Alice-and-Bob notation would be as follows:
1. A → S : A, B
2. S → A : PAB , {PAB , B, 2}KA
3. A → B : A, NA
4. B → A : NB , {NA, NB , 1}KAB
5. B → A : {SK}KAB
6. A → B : {NB , 0, 1}KAB
where A,B denote principal names, NA and NB denote nonces generated by
participants, {M}K denotes encryption of message M using key K, * is the
exclusive-or operator and 0 and 1 denote a sortrbitrary padding constants,
known by all principals.
We use this attack pattern to check if the session key is secure
eq ATTACK-STATE(0)
= :: r :: *** Bob ***
[nil, -(a ; NCA),
+(n(b,r) ; e(nse(symKey(b), a), NCA ; n(b,r) ; 1)),
*** Simulation: Bob sends session key to Alice
+(e(nse(symKey(b), a), sesK(n(b,r), a, b, 1))),
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-(e(nse(symKey(b), a), n(b,r) ; 0 ; 1)) | nil]
|| sesK(n(b,r), a, b, 1) inI
|| nil
|| nil
|| nil
[nonexec] .
As you can see in Section 4.6.4 this protocol is secure.
4.6.1 Symbols
The symbols that we use for this protocol are the same that we use for the
Shoup-Rubin protocol in Section 4.5.1.
4.6.2 Algebraic properties
As in the previous section, we use the same equational properties that we use
for the Shoup-Rubin protocol in Section 4.5.2.
4.6.3 Strand specification
In this section we describe the strands denoting the actions of the protocol’s
honest principals and the intruder capabilities. The strands of this protocol are
specified as follows:
:: r :: *** Alice ***
[nil | +(A ; B),
-((PAB * nse(symKey(A), B ; 1)) ;
(se(symKey(A), (PAB * nse(symKey(A), B)) ; B ; 2))),
+(A ; n(A,r)),
-(NCB ; e(PAB, n(A,r) ; NCB)),
***Simulation: Bob sends session key to Alice
-(e(PAB, sesK(NCB, A, B, 1))),
+(e(PAB, NCB ; 0 ; 1)), nil]
&
:: r :: *** Bob ***
[nil | -(A ; NCA),
+(n(B,r) ; e(nse(symKey(B), A), NCA ; n(B,r) ; 1)),
*** Simulation: Bob sends session key to Alice
+(e(nse(symKey(B), A), sesK(n(B,r), A, B, 1))),
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-(e(nse(symKey(B), A), n(B,r) ; 0 ; 1)), nil]
&
:: nil :: *** Server ***
[nil | -(A ; B),
+((nse(symKey(B), A ; 0) * nse(symKey(A), B ; 1)) ;
se(symKey(A),
(nse(symKey(B), A ; 0) * nse(symKey(A), B ; 1) ; B ; 2), nil]
where A and B are variables denoting names and NCA and NCB are variables
denoting nonces of A and B respectively and 0 and 1 denote a sort of arbitrary
padding constants.
The intruder capabilities of the Symmetric key distribution using Smart
Cards (SK3) are the same of the Shoup-Rubin protocol, which are specified by
the strands of Section 6.5.3.
4.6.4 Protocol analysis
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool is
as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 2 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 0 Solutions>> 0
The protocol is secure against this attack and, when this protocol is analyzed
with Maude-NPA, it generates a finite search state space finding no initial state
for the attack pattern above.
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Chapter 5
The CCA series of protocols
CCA stands for Common Cryptographic Architecture API [IBM 08] as imple-
mented on the hardware security module IBM 4758 (an IBM cryptographic
coprocessor). As we can see in [Keighren 06], the CCA is a key management
system, which provides commands that use encrypted keys to achieve desired
functions. A 168-bit triple-DES key, known as the master key, is stored in the
security module’s tamper proof memory and is used to encrypt all other keys
which are then kept on the host computer. These other keys, known as work-
ing keys, are used to perform the various functions provided by the CCA API,
and have types associated with them. In all, the CCA supports the following
functions and features:
− Encryption and decryption of data, using the DES algorithm
[DES Encryption].
− Message authentication code (MAC) generation, and data hashing func-
tions.
− Formation and validation of digital signatures.
− Generation, encryption, translation and verification of PINs and transac-
tion validation messages.
− General key management facilities.
− Administrative services for controlling the initialization and operation of
the security module.
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As a number of the provided commands are particularly sensitive, the CCA
enforces an access-control system, whereby certain commands are only available
under specific circumstances. It is, however, the responsibility of the device
administrator to ensure that the correct separation of duty provided is upheld.
The CCA API uses four main types for classifying DES working keys, each
of which is further sub-divided into more specific and restrictive types. Each
type takes the form of a control vector (a bit-string that is the same length as
the associated working key). A working key is stored outside of the security
module, encrypted under the exclusive-or of the device’s master key and the
control vector representing the type of the key. The main key types, and their
uses, are as follows:
Data Keys
Keys of this type are used to encipher and decipher arbitrary data, as well as
for the generation and verification of message authentication codes (MACs).
Subtypes place greater restrictions on exactly which of these various functions
a particular key can be used for.
PIN Keys
This type covers keys which are used for PIN block encryption, PIN block de-
cryption, PIN generation and verification, and just PIN verification. A key
cannot be of the general PIN type, but instead must be assigned a subtype that
restricts its use to exactly one of the four operations mentioned.
Key Encryption Keys
These keys are used to encrypt and decrypt other working keys during transfer
between security modules, and are divided into import and export types. Keys
encrypted under an export key are referred to as external keys, as they must be
imported into a security module before they can be used. Note that the transfer
of a working key requires the same key encryption key to be present in both
security modules (as an export key in one and as an import key in the other).
Key Generation Keys
The CCA API provides commands which generate DES keys, given an initial
key, and will typically use the provided key to encrypt or decrypt a supplied
piece of data. This type covers such initial keys and restricts them from being
used with other commands (e.g. Encipher and Decipher) in order to prevent
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the value of the generated key being discovered.
The typing mechanism restricts the working keys which can be used for a
particular command, for example, the PIN derivation key used in the verifica-
tion of a customer’s PIN cannot be used with the Encipher command to encrypt
arbitrary data.
The following terms are used in this section to represent the various control
vectors and cryptographic keys:
− DATA → Control vector for data keys
− IMP → Control vector for import-type key encryption keys
− EXP → Control vector for export-type key encryption keys
− KP → Control vector indicating that a key is only a key part, and not a
complete key
− KM → The security module-s master key
− ekek → An arbitrary key encryption key
− ek → An arbitrary cryptographic key
− T → An unknown, randomly generated, new cryptographic key An arbi-
trary key type control vector. We can say that T ∈ {DATA, IMP,EXP,PIN}.
− kpi → Key part i (used to build an arbitrary key)
− x → Arbitrary (unencrypted) data
The exact steps that the security module carries out for each command have
not been included, since the process is virtually the same in all cases. The
master key and all control vectors are known to the security module, and any
additional information required is either passed as a plaintext parameter, or
is encrypted under a known key. For example, in the case of the Key Import
command, the security module knows both KM and IMP so is therefore able to
obtain kek from the third parameter. This key encryption key is then XOR-ed
with the second parameter, type, and used to obtain key from the first parame-
ter. Finally, key is encrypted under the exclusive-or of KM and type to produce
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the result that is returned by the command.
In the following we test nine protocols:
− CCA-0 Original (Section 5.1)
− CCA-0 version of Ku¨esters and Truderung (Section 5.2)
− CCA-1A (Section 5.4)
− CCA-1B (Section 5.5)
− CCA-1B version of Ku¨esters and Truderung Original (Section 5.6)
− CCA-2B (Section 5.8)
− CCA-2C (Section 5.9)
− CCA-2C version of Ku¨esters and Truderung Original (Section 5.10)
− CCA-2E (Section 5.11)
5.1 CCA-0 Original
In this section we describe the specification and analysis of the original CCA
protocol (CCA-0).
The informal description of the CCA API is as follows:
API Operator Description
Encipher x, {eK}{KM∗DATA} → {x}eK
Decipher {x}eK , {eK}{KM∗DATA} → x
Key Export {eK}(KM∗T}, T, {ekek}{KM∗EXP} → {eK}(ekek∗T )
Key Import {eK}(kek∗T}, T, {kek}{KM∗IMP} → {eK}{KM∗T}
Key Part Import
First
km1, T → {km1}{KM∗KP∗T}
Key Part Import
Middle
km2, km1{KM∗KP∗T}, T→ (km1 * km2){KM∗KP∗T}
Key Part Import
Last
km3, km2{KM∗KP∗T}, T→ (km2 * km3){KM∗KP∗T}
Key Translate {eK}ekek1∗T , T, {ekek1}KM∗IMP , {ekek2}KM∗EXP
→ {eK}(ekek2∗T )
Table 5.1: CCA API operators and description.
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The Encipher rule corresponds to a data encryption command which allows
data keys to be used to encrypt any given plaintext. Decipher allows data
keys to be used for decryption. Key Export is used to encrypt a working key
under a key encrypting key for transport to another HSM (hardware security
modules). Key Import allows a key from another 4758 module, encrypted for
transport under a Key Encrypting Key (KEK), to be made into a working key
for this HSM (Hardware Security Modules). The three Key Part Import com-
mands can then be used one after the other, by three different security officers,
each in possession of one key part, to create the working import key. It is this
process that is subverted in Bond’ attack to change the type of a key. The
last API operator, Key Translate, is used to encrypt a key under a different
key-encryption-key.
This series of commands builds up a working key from individual parts and
can be used in one of two ways. Either the first, the middle and last commands
can be used. In order to provide security through separation of duty, the com-
mands are split into three groups, with individuals only allowed access to one,
so the combination of these three commands allows more than one individual to
obtain completed working keys. The other combination ensures that the people
responsible for inserting the key parts cannot obtain a final key and the person
who obtains the final key cannot modify it in any way.
In this specification X denotes a sort Msg, eK, ekek, km1, km2, km3 denote
a sort Key and * is the exclusive-or operator.
This protocol is insecure. The attack that we found uses the same assump-
tions as Bond’s attack [Bond 01] in terms of the role played by the intruder and
his knowledge, and this attack is the same that found Ku¨esters and Truderung
in [Ku¨esters 11]. As a result of the attack, the intruder obtains a PIN derivation
key in clear, like in the IBM attack and hence, can compute PINs from bank
account numbers. We use several strands in the attack pattern to prevent the
increase of the number of generated states becomes this protocol into unhandled.
Since the sequence of exchanged messages of this initial state is quite long,
we explain it below step by step.
First, the intruder receives {km1 ∗ km2}{IMP∗KP∗KM}, then he performs
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Key Part Import Last with {k3 * pin} instead of {k3}. In this way he ob-
tains {PIN ∗ km1 ∗ km2 ∗ km3}{IMP∗KM}.
Next the intruder uses the same command again, this time with {k3 * pin *
exp}, obtaining {PIN ∗ km1 ∗ km2 ∗ km3}{IMP∗KM}.
Next, when {PDK} is imported, the intruder uses Key Import twice: The
first time with input {PIN ∗ km1 ∗ km2 ∗ km3}{IMP∗KM} and
{PDK}{PIN∗km1∗km2∗km3} and the results is the message {PDK}{KM}.
The second time the command Key Import is used with input
{PIN ∗ EXP ∗ km1 ∗ km2 ∗ km3}{IMP∗KM}, and {PDK}{PIN∗km1∗km2∗km3}
and {type = exp}, which gives the message {PDK}{EXP∗KM}.
Now, using Key Export with input {PDK}{KM} and {PDK}{EXP∗KM},
the attacker obtains {PDK}{PDK}.
Finally, using Decipher with input {PDK}{PDK} and {PDK}{KM}, the
attacker obtains the clear value of PDK, which can be then used to obtain the
PIN for any account number: Given an account number, the corresponding PIN
is derived by encrypting the account number under PDK.
5.1.1 Symbols
In the following we show how to specify the sorts and symbols for this protocol
in the Maude-NPA’s syntax. More specifically, we need sorts to denote names,
different kinds of keys and encrypted data. This is specified as follows:
sorts Name Nonce Key Null type KPdk KData KPin KExp KImp
KKek KMaster KKP .
subsort Name Nonce Key < Msg .
subsort KData KPin KExp KImp < type .
subsort KMaster type KKek Null KKP KPdk < Key .
subsort Null < KData .
subsort Name < Public .
subsort Null type < Public .
The specification in Maude-NPA of the different key operators is as follows:
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op DATA : -> KData .
op PIN : -> KPin .
op EXP : -> KExp .
op IMP : -> KImp .
op KP : -> KKP .
op PDK : -> KPdk .
op KM : -> KMaster .
These operators were previously defined in Chapter 5, We can now specify
the different operators needed in CCA-0. We specify some principal names. For
XOR-NSL, we have three constants of sort Name, a (for Alice), b (for Bob) and i
(for the Intruder). We need two more operators: one for concatenation and one
for the XOR. Message concatenation is specified in Maude-NPA via the infix
operator ( ; ), which is defined as follows:
op _ ; _ : Msg Msg -> Msg [gather (e E) frozen].
Next we define the characteristics of the XOR operator which is need to
be define twice, one to be used with variables of type Msg and another to be
used with variables of type Key. Also we indicate that both operators have the
associative and commutative properties.
op _ * _ : Msg Msg -> Msg [assoc comm frozen] .
op _ * _ : Key Key -> Key [ditto] .
Finally we define a customer’s account number (PAN)), as a constant of sort
Msg operator.
op PAN : -> Msg .
5.1.2 Algebraic properties
In this section we specify the algebraic properties of the symbols defined above
for the CCA-0 protocol, using equations apart of associative, commutative and
identity properties. In CCA-0, we use two equations specifying the relationship
between public and private key encryption, as follows:
var X : Msg . var A : Name .
eq pk(A,sk(A,X)) = X .
eq sk(A,pk(A,X)) = X .
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The properties of the XOR operator are denoted by the following equations:
vars XN YN : Msg .
eq null * XN = XN [variant].
eq XN * XN = null [variant] .
eq XN * XN * YN = YN [variant] .
Note that the redundant equational property XN ∗ XN ∗ Y N = Y N is
necessary in Maude-NPA for coherence purposes; see [Escobar 09].
Finally as we can see in [Ku¨esters 11] we use for DATA operator the following
equation:
eq DATA = null [variant] .
We use two equations specifying the relationship between encryption and
decryption, as follows:
eq d(K:Key, e(K:Key, Z:Msg)) = Z:Msg [variant] .
eq e(K:Key, d(K:Key, Z:Msg)) = Z:Msg [variant] .
5.1.3 Strand specification
For this protocol we have followed the original protocol specification instead of
the version described in [Ku¨esters 11], which is a simplified version of the orig-
inal protocol.
Here we show the strand specification, of the original version of the protocol,
in Maude-NPA.
eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL
***Strands for the transaction
= :: nil :: ***Encryption with data key
[nil | -(X),
-(e(KM * DATA, eK)),
+(e(eK, X)), nil]
&
:: nil :: ***Decryption with data key
[nil | -(e(eK, X)),
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-(e(KM * DATA, eK)),
+(X), nil]
&
:: nil :: ***Key Import
[nil | -(e(kek * T, eK)),
-(T),
-(e(KM * IMP, kek)),
+(e(KM * T, eK)), nil]
&
:: nil :: ***Key Export
[nil | -(e(KM * T, eK)),
-(T),
-(e(KM * EXP, ekek)),
+(e(ekek * T, eK)), nil]
&
:: nil :: ***Key Part Import First
[nil | -(km1),
-(T),
+(e(KM * KP * T, km1)), nil]
&
:: nil :: ***Key Part Import Middle
[nil | -(km2),
-(T),
-(e(KM * KP * T, km1)),
+(e(KM * KP * T, km1 * km2)), nil]
&
:: nil :: ***Key Part Import Last
[nil | -(km3),
-(T),
-(e(KM * KP * T, km2)),
+(e(KM * T, km2 * km3)), nil]
[nonexec] .
where X is a variable of sort Msg, K, kek, km1, km2 and km3 are variables of
sort Key and T is a variable of sort Type.
The intruder capabilities are specified by the following strands:
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eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO
= :: nil :: [nil | -(X), -(Y), +(X * Y), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(X), -(K), +(e(K,X)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(X), -(K), +(d(K,X)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(Km3) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(PIN) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(IMP) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(EXP) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | +(null), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(e(KM * KP * IMP, Km1 * Km2)) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(e(Km1 * Km2 * Km3 * PIN, PDK)) | nil]
[nonexec] .
where variables X and Y denote messages and variable K denotes a sort key.
The first strand allows the intruder to perform the XOR. The second and third
strands allows the intruder to perform encryption and decryption. The fourth,
fifth, sixth and seventh strands allow the intruder to generate different kind of
keys. The eight strand allows the intruder to generate the XOR null element. As
we can see in [Ku¨esters 11], the ninth and tenth strands show how the intruder
can perform KPILast and how the key kek(Km1 ∗ Km2 ∗ Km3) is used to
import a new PIN -derivation key (PDK) to the security module, respectively.
5.1.4 Protocol analysis
The specifications of the attack in Maude-NPA is as follows:
eq ATTACK-STATE(0)
= empty
|| e(PDK, PDK) inI
|| nil
|| nil
|| NP: NeverPatterns
[nonexec] .
where NP denotes a set of ?Never patterns? to reduce the search space (See
Appendix A).
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
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reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 3 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 5 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 13 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 8 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 7 Solutions>> 1
For this attack pattern Maude-NPA finds an initial state as it was expected.
The sequence of exchanged messages of the attack is as follows:
+(e(PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3, PDK)),
+(e(IMP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)),
-(e(PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3, PDK)),
-(EXP),
-(e(IMP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)),
+(e(EXP * KM, PDK)),
+(e(IMP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)),
-(e(PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3, PDK)),
-(null),
-(e(IMP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)),
+(e(KM, PDK)),
-(e(KM, PDK)),
-(null),
-(e(EXP * KM, PDK)),
+(e(PDK, PDK))
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5.2 CCA-0 version of Ku¨esters and Truderung
In this section we describe the specification and analysis of the version of the
original CCA-0 protocol they made Ku¨esters and Truderung in [Ku¨esters 11]
(CCA-0 Ku¨esters and Truderung).
The informal description of the CCA API is as follows:
API Operator Description
Encipher x, {eK}{KM∗DATA} → {x}eK
Decipher {x}eK , {eK}{KM∗DATA} → x
Key Export {eK}(KM∗T}, T, {ekek}{KM∗EXP} → {eK}(ekek∗T )
Key Import {eK}(kek∗T}, T, {kek}{KM∗IMP} → {eK}{KM∗T}
KPI-First +
KPI-Add/Middle
km12, T → {KM * KP * IMP}
Key Part Import
Last
x, T, KM * KP * T → (x){KM∗T}
x, IMP → (X * km12){KM∗IMP}
The Encipher, Decipher, Key Export and Key Import API operators are
the same that the CCA-0 original protocol (see Section 5.1). The KPI-First
+ KPI-Add/Middle and Key Part Import Last API operators are the equiv-
alent to the original Key Part Import First , Key Part Import Middle and
Key Part Import Last API operators. They do these modifications to the orig-
inals API operators because they had problems to manage the entire exclusive-or
theory. The way that this version of the protocol works is the same that for
original version (see Section 5.1).
All the variables are the same that for the CCA-0 original protocol except
the km12 variable that denotes a sort Key.
This protocol is insecure as the original CCA-0 protocol. The attack is the
same that we could found in the original version (see Section 5.1)
5.2.1 Symbols
All the symbols are the same that for the original version of the protocol except
the one for the km12 variable . This is specified in Maude-NPA as follows:
sorts Key Msg .
subsort Key < Msg .
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We can now specify the km12 variable as follows:
var km12 : Key .
The specification in Maude-NPA of the different key operators are the same
that for the original version of the protocol (see Section 5.2)
5.2.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of this protocol version are the same than in the original
version (see Section 5.1.2).
5.2.3 Strand specification
The strand specification is the same than in the original version (see Section
5.1.3) except for the Key Part Import Last operator. Here we show the specifica-
tion of the Ku¨esters and Truderung version of this API operator in Maude-NPA.
:: nil :: *** Key Import Last
[nil | -(X),
-(T),
-(KM * KP * T),
+(e(KM * T, X)), nil]
&
:: nil :: *** Key Import Last
[nil | -(X),
-(IMP),
+(e(KM * IMP, X * km12)), nil]
[nonexec] .
where X is a variable of sort Msg, km12 is a variable of sort Key and T is a
variable of sort Type.
The intruder capabilities are specified by the following strands:
eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO
= :: nil :: [nil | -(X), -(Y), +(X * Y), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(X), -(K), +(e(K,X)), nil ] &
:: nil :: [nil | -(X), -(K), +(d(K,X)), nil ] &
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:: nil :: [nil, +(Km3) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(PIN) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(IMP) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(EXP) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil | +(null), nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(e(KM * KP * IMP, Km12)) | nil] &
:: nil :: [nil, +(e(Km1 * Km2 * Km3 * PIN, PDK)) | nil]
[nonexec] .
where variables X and Y denote messages and variable K denotes a sort key.
The first strand allows the intruder to perform the XOR. The second and third
strands allows the intruder to perform encryption and decryption. The fourth,
fifth, sixth and seventh strands allow the intruder to generate different kind
of keys. The eight strand allows the intruder to generate the XOR null ele-
ment. The ninth strand shows how the intruder can perform the modification
of the original protocol that made Ku¨esters and Truderung of Key Part Import
First and Key Part Import Middle and the tenth strand shows how the key
kek(Km1 ∗Km2 ∗Km3) is used to import a new PIN -derivation key (PDK)
to the security module.
5.2.4 Protocol analysis
The specifications of the attack in Maude-NPA is as follows:
eq ATTACK-STATE(0)
= empty
|| e(PDK, PDK) inI
|| nil
|| nil
|| nil
[nonexec] .
Keep in mind one important thing, as this version is simplest than the
original version of the protocol we do not need any never pattern to reduce
the search space to obtain the desired result.
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
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reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 6 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 51 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 331 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 547 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 624 Solutions>> 1
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 936 Solutions>> 4
For this attack pattern Maude-NPA finds an initial state as it was expected.
The sequence of exchanged messages of the attack is as follows:
+(e(PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3, PDK)),
-(null),
-(IMP),
+(e(IMP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)),
-(EXP),
-(IMP),
+(e(IMP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)),
-(e(PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3, PDK)),
-(null),
-(e(IMP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)),
+(e(KM, PDK)),
-(e(PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3, PDK)),
-(EXP),
-(e(IMP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)),
+(e(EXP * KM, PDK)),
-(e(KM, PDK)),
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-(null),
-(e(EXP * KM, PDK)),
+(e(PDK, PDK))
5.3 IBM’s first recommendations to avoid the
attack
In order to prevent the attack of the CCA-0 protocol [Bond 01], IBM proposed
two recommendation. At the first one, they argue the attack would have to
be carried out by an insider and that the vulnerability is intrinsic to public key
schemes. We suggest that access control should be used to restrict any single in-
sider from having access to both the PKA Symmetric Key Import, Key Import
and Key Translate. The PKA Symmetric Key Import takes an encrypted data
block, containing the key to be imported and corresponding type information
and returns the key encrypted under the local master key. The data block is
encrypted under the public key that corresponds to the security modules private
key.
We created two models, each one allowing access to only one of these functions
and checked them with Maude-NPA. The different API operators for the IBM’s
first recommendation are as follows:
API Operator CCA-1A CCA-1B
Encipher X X
Decipher X X
Key Export X X
Key Import X
PKA Symmetric
Key Import
X
Key Translate X
Table 5.2: CCA API operators and description.
5.4 CCA-1A
In this section, we explain the specification and analysis of the CCA-1A proto-
col, that restricts the kind of commands that certain rules may perform. This
70
5.4. CCA-1A
version of the protocol uses a subset of operations of the original CCA-0 proto-
col (See Section 5.1).
5.4.1 Symbols
The symbols that we use for this version of the protocol are the same that we
use for the original one (see Section 5.1.1).
5.4.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of this protocol version are the same than in the original
version (see Section 5.1.2).
5.4.3 Strand specification
The strand specification that we use for this subset of the API operators of the
protocol are the same that we use for the original one (see Section 5.1.3).
The intruder capabilities that we use for this protocol are the same that we
use for the CCA-0 protocol (see Section 5.1.3).
5.4.4 Protocol analysis
We use the same attack pattern of the CCA-0 protocol in Section 5.1.4, but in
this case NP denotes a different set of ?Never patterns? to reduce the search
space (See Appendix B).
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 5 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 9 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
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result Summary: States>> 6 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 0 Solutions>> 0
The protocol is secure against this attack and when this protocol is analyzed
with Maude-NPA, it generates a finite search state space finding no initial state
for the attack pattern above.
5.5 CCA-1B
In this section, we explain the specification and analysis of the CCA-1B protocol,
that restricts the kind of commands that certain rules may perform. This version
of the protocol uses a subset of operations of the original CCA-0 protocol and
a new one called PKA Symmetric Key Import. As we previously define,
PKA Symmetric Key Import takes an encrypted data block, containing
the key to be imported and corresponding type information and returns the key
encrypted under the local master key. The data block is encrypted under the
public key that corresponds to the security module private key.
The informal specification of this operator is as follows:
PKA Symmetric Key Import
{eK ; T}PKA → {eK}(KM∗T )
5.5.1 Symbols
The symbols that we use for this version of the protocol are the same that we
use for the original one (see Section 5.1.1).
5.5.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of this protocol version are the same than in the original
version (see Section 5.1.2).
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5.5.3 Strand specification
The strand specification that we use for this subset of the API operators of the
protocol are the same that we use for the original one (see Section 5.1.3 ), and
a new one called PKA Symmetric Key Import.
The specification in Maude-NPA of the new operator is as follows:
:: nil :: ***PKA Symmetric Key Import
[nil | -(e(PKA, eK ; T)),
+(e(KM * T, eK)), nil]
The intruder capabilities that we use for this protocol are the same that we
use for the CCA-0 protocol (see Section 5.1.3).
5.5.4 Protocol analysis
We use the same attack pattern of the CCA-0 protocol in Section 5.1.4, but in
this case NP denotes a different set of ?Never patterns? to reduce the search
space (See Appendix B).
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 2 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 8 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 19 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 13 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 4 Solutions>> 0
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reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 0 Solutions>> 0
The protocol is secure against this attack and, when this protocol is analyzed
with Maude-NPA, it generates a finite search state space finding no initial state
for the attack pattern above.
5.6 CCA-1B version of Ku¨esters and Truderung
In this section, we explain the specification and analysis of the the version they
made Ku¨esters and Truderung in [Ku¨esters 11] of the original CCA-1B protocol.
In this section we describe the specification and analysis of the version of the
CCA-1B protocol they made Ku¨esters and Truderung in [Ku¨esters 11]. The dif-
ference between this version and the original version is that they cannot handle
the entire exclusive-or theory and because of that should transform the original
Key Translate API operator:
{eK}ekek1∗T , T, {ekek1}KM∗IMP , {ekek2}KM∗EXP → {eK}(ekek2∗T )
into these two rules:
{eK}ekek1∗T , T, {ekek1}KM∗IMP → transf(eK,T)
transf(eK,T), {ekek2}{KM∗EXP} → {eK}(ekek2∗T )
5.6.1 Symbols
The symbols that we use for this version of the protocol are the same that we use
for the original one (see Section 5.1.1) except the one for the transf function.
This is specified as follows:
op transf : Key Tipo -> Tipo [frozen] .
This operator is used in Key Translate API operator to translate a key from
encryption under one KEK (of import type) to encryption under another (of
export type).
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5.6.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of this protocol version are the same than in the original
version (see Section 5.1.2).
5.6.3 Strand specification
The strand specification that we use for this subset of the API operators of the
protocol are the same that we use for the version of the original one (see Section
5.2.3) made by Ku¨esters and Truderung, and two new API operators, one called
PKA Symmetric Key Import, and a second one called Key Translate
The specification in Maude-NPA of the first one is as follows:
:: nil :: ***PKA Symmetric Key Import
[nil | -(e(PKA, eK ; T)),
+(e(KM * T, eK)), nil]
And the specification in Maude-NPA of the second one is as follows:
:: nil :: *** Key Translate
[nil | -(e(Kek1 * T, eK)),
-(T),
-(e(KM * IMP, Kek1)),
+(transf(eK, T)), nil]
&
:: nil :: *** Key Translate
[nil | -(transf(eK, T)),
-(e(KM * IMP, Kek2)),
-(e(Kek2 * T, eK)), nil]
[nonexec] .
The intruder capabilities that we use for this protocol are the same that we
use for the CCA-0 protocol (see Section 5.1.3).
5.6.4 Protocol analysis
We use the same attack pattern of the CCA-0 protocol in Section 5.1.4, to prove
if the recommendation works as it should.
75
CHAPTER 5. THE CCA SERIES OF PROTOCOLS
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 0 Solutions>> 0
The protocol is secure against this attack and, when this protocol is analyzed
with Maude-NPA, it generates a finite search state space finding no initial state
for the attack pattern above.
5.7 IBM’s second recommendations to avoid the
attack
In order to avoid the attack of the CCA-0 protocol explained in section 5.1.4,
IBM suggested another recommendation. This recommendation use the Access
Control System. Users of IBMs 4758 HSM are assigned to roles that determine
which commands they are allowed to execute. The goal is to prevent one single
individual from having access to all the commands required to mount Bonds
attack. This is enforced using access controls. IBM provide an example of the
KEK transfer process involving five roles (A -E) such that no single role is able
to mount the attack, as we can see in the next table
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ATTACK
Person Responsibilities Commands
A the two clear key parts, using the Ran-
dom Number Generate command, and
the key verification pattern (KVP)
for the complete key encryption key
(KEK). The First key part is given to
person B, the second to person C, and
the verification pattern to persons C
and E.
Not Applicable
B Enters the first key part into the des-
tination security module.
Key Part Import 1
C Enters the two clear key parts, using
the Random Number Generate com-
mand, and the key verification pattern
(KVP) for the complete key encryp-
tion key (KEK). The First key part is
given to person B, the second to per-
son C, and the verification pattern to
persons C and E.
Key Part Import 3
Key Test
D Distributes the PIN derivation key
(PDK) encrypted under KEK.
Not Applicable
E Verifies that the KEK is correct, then
imports the PDK.
Key Import.
Key Test
Table 5.3: Roles described by IBM in their 2nd recommendation.
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The different API operators and their description for the IBM’s second rec-
ommendation are as follows:
API Operator CCA-2B CCA-2C CCA-2E
Encipher X X X
Decipher X X X
Key Export X X X
Key Import X X
Key Part Import
First
X X
Key Part Import
Last
X
Key Test X X
Table 5.4: CCA Original API operators for the IBM’s second recommendation.
API Operator CCA-2B CCA-2C CCA-2E
Encipher X X X
Decipher X X X
Key Export X X X
Key Import X X
Key Part Import
First
X X
Key Part Import
Last
X
KPI-First + KPI-
Add/Middle
X X
Table 5.5: CCA version of Ku¨esters and Truderung API operators for the IBM’s
second recommendation.
The Key Test API operator command is the equivalent to the KPI-First
+ KPI-Add/Middle API operator command of the version of the protocol of
Ku¨esters and Truderung. It’s important to highlight that even though “Key
Part Import Last” API operator has the same name in both versions, the spec-
ification is different. At the original version, the informal specification is as
follows:
Key Part Import Last
km3, km2{KM∗KP∗T}, T → (km2 * km3){KM∗KP∗T}
Meanwhile for the second one, the modified version of the protocol that made
78
5.8. CCA-2B
Ku¨esters and Truderung in [Ku¨esters 11], the informal specification is as follows:
Key Part Import Last
x, T, KM * KP * T → (x){KM∗T}
x, IMP → (X * km12){KM∗IMP}
To implement this recommendation, additional access control needs to be
assumed, to ensure that no single role is able to perform an attack. From
Sections 5.8 to the 5.10 we follow these recommendations of the CCA protocol.
For this second recommendation, we specify the original CCA-2B, CCA-2C and
CCA-2E and a version of CCA-2C they made Ku¨esters and Truderung of the
original specification of the CCA-2C protocol. This is the only that has different
specifications of the original protocol due to their problems to handle the entire
exclusive-or theory as you could see in Section 5.7.
5.8 CCA-2B
In this section following the second recommendation of IBM we implement the
role of person B, who enters the first key part into the destination security
module as shown in Table 5.3.
5.8.1 Symbols
The symbols that we use for this version of the protocol are the same that we
use for the original one (see Section 5.1.1).
5.8.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of this protocol version are the same than in the original
version (see Section 5.1.2).
5.8.3 Strand specification
The strand specification that we use for this subset of the API operators of the
protocol are the same that we use for the original one (see Section 5.1.3). The
intruder capabilities that we use for this protocol are the same that we use for
the CCA-0 protocol (see Section 5.1.3).
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5.8.4 Protocol analysis
We use the same attack pattern of the CCA-0 protocol in Section 5.1.4, but in
this case NP denotes a different set of ?Never patterns? to reduce the search
space (See Appendix B).
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 3 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 3 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 10 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 7 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(7) .
result Summary: States>> 7 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(8) .
result Summary: States>> 2 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(9) .
result Summary: States>> 10 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(10) .
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result Summary: States>> 6 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(11) .
result Summary: States>> 0 Solutions>> 0
The protocol is secure against this attack and, when this protocol is analyzed
with Maude-NPA, it generates a finite search state space finding no initial state
for the attack pattern above.
5.9 CCA-2C
In this Section we describe a version of the CCA protocol fulfilling IBM’ second
recommendation. This protocol version implements the role of person C, enters
the second key part and verifies that the completed KEK is correct by checking
the Key Verification Pattern (KVP). Key Test verifies that the completed
KEK is correct by checking the key verification pattern (KVP), that can be
specified. The informal description of this operator is as follows:
Key Test
:: nil :: [ nil | +(e(KM * KP * IMP, Km1 * Km2)), nil]
5.9.1 Symbols
The symbols that we use for this version of the protocol are the same that we
use for the original one (see Section 5.1.1).
5.9.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of this protocol version are the same than in the original
version (see Section 5.1.2).
5.9.3 Strand specification
The strand specification that we use for this subset of the API operators of the
protocol are the same that we use for the original one (see Section 5.2.3), and a
new one called Key Test.
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The intruder capabilities that we use for this protocol are the same that we
use for the CCA-0 protocol (see Section 5.1.3).
5.9.4 Protocol analysis
We use the same attack pattern of the CCA-0 protocol in Section 5.1.4, but in
this case NP denotes a different set of ?Never patterns? to reduce the search
space (See Appendix B).
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 3 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 15 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 31 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 38 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 17 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(7) .
result Summary: States>> 26 Solutions>> 0
At the original version of the protocol (see Section 5.1.4), the attacker just
needs seven steps to find an initial state for the attack-state, so we could as-
sume that if in this version we reached the seventh step without finding an initial
state, the tool won’t find a solution for this attack, so the protocol is secure.
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This bound could be set much higher, but informal analysis of the tool’s out-
put, shows that the intruder never would be able to obtain any useful new terms.
At TACAS’s paper [Cortier 07] they do the following assumption for the
same protocol:
Person Bound Analysed
States
Reachable
States
Run-Time (s)
C 3 413 68 58.22
where they do a similar assumption to ours to arrive to the same conclusion.
5.10 CCA-2C version of Ku¨esters and Truderung
In this section we describe the specification and analysis of the version of the
CCA-2C protocol they made Ku¨esters and Truderung in [Ku¨esters 11].
5.10.1 Symbols
The symbols that we use for this version of the protocol are the same that we
use for the original one (see Section 5.2.1).
5.10.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of this protocol version are the same than in the original
version (see Section 5.2.2).
5.10.3 Strand specification
The strand specification that we use for this subset of the API operators of
the protocol are the same that we use for the original one (see Section 5.2.3),
and a new one called Key Test using the same specification that in the original
version for this API operator .
The difference between this version of Ku¨esters and Truderung [Ku¨esters 11] and
the original version is the specification of the Key Import Last API operator as
we could see in Section 5.7. You could see the specification of the Key Import
Last API operator in Maude-NPA in Section 5.2.3.
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The intruder capabilities that we use for this protocol are the same that we
use for the CCA-0 protocol (see Section 5.2.3).
5.10.4 Protocol analysis
We use the same attack pattern of the CCA-0 protocol in Section 5.2.4, to prove
if the recommendation works as it should.
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 2 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 6 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 26 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 48 Solutions>> 0
This bound could be set much higher, but informal analysis of the tool’s out-
put, shows that the intruder never would be able to obtain any useful new terms.
At TACAS’s paper [Cortier 07] they do the following assumption for the
same protocol:
Person Bound Analysed
States
Reachable
States
Run-Time (s)
C 3 413 68 58.22
where they do a similar assumption to ours to arrive to the same conclusion.
5.11 CCA-2E
In this section, we implement the role of person E, that verifies that the KEK
is correct, then imports the PDK. This version of the protocol uses a subset
of operations of the original CCA-0 protocol (See Section 5.1), and Key Test
operator (See Section 5.8).
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5.11.1 Symbols
The symbols that we use for this version of the protocol are the same that we
use for the original one (see Section 5.1.1).
5.11.2 Algebraic properties
The algebraic properties of this protocol version are the same than in the original
version (see Section 5.1.2).
5.11.3 Strand specification
The strand specification that we use for this subset of the API operators of the
protocol are the same that we use for the original one (see Section 5.1.3 to see
the strand specification and see Appendix B to see all the never patterns that
we use in this specification for this recommendation) and Key Test operator
(See Section 5.8.3). The intruder capabilities that we use for this protocol are
the same that we use for the CCA-2B protocol (see Section 5.8.3).
5.11.4 Protocol analysis
We use the same attack pattern of the CCA-0 protocol in Section 5.1.4, but in
this case NP denotes a different set of ?Never patterns? to reduce the search
space (See Appendix B).
The number of generated states in the different levels with Maude-NPA tool
is as follows:
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(1) .
result Summary: States>> 1 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(2) .
result Summary: States>> 3 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(3) .
result Summary: States>> 9 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(4) .
result Summary: States>> 25 Solutions>> 0
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reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(5) .
result Summary: States>> 57 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 133 Solutions>> 0
reduce in MAUDE-NPA : summary(6) .
result Summary: States>> 157 Solutions>> 0
As in CCA-2C protocol (see Section 5.8.4), the original version of the proto-
col (see Section 5.1.4), the attacker just needs seven steps to find an initial state
for the attack-state, so we could assume that if in the new version we reached
the seventh step without solution, the tool won’t find a solution for this attack,
so the protocol is secure. This bound could be set much higher, but informal
analysis of the tool’s output, shows that the intruder never would be able to
obtain any useful new terms.
At TACAS’s paper [Cortier 07] they do the following assumption for the
same protocol:
Person Bound Analysed
States
Reachable
States
Run-Time (s)
E 10 54 10 0.03
where they do a similar assumption to ours to arrive to the same conclusion.
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Conclusions
From this work we can draw some interesting conclusions. The first one is
how the Maude-NPA can work effectively and appropriate with protocols with
exclusive-or operator and its properties. This has been really useful to us, since
previously existing collection of protocols that handle this property was very
meager, being now far more extensive. By reference to the work of Ralf Ku¨esters
and Tomasz Truderung (see [Ku¨esters 11]), we found another interesting thing
about the Maude-NPA. This has happened on the analysis of the CCA API
protocol. While they, unable to handle the full theory of XOR, were working on
a modified version of the protocol, the Maude-NPA tool could handle both the
modified version and the full version. This has also happened in the versions
that have been made based on IBM recommendations. In these, Maude-NPA
could handle the full versions of these variants, while the tool used by Ku¨esters
and Truderung in his paper could not handle it and must modify some of the
versions recommended by IBM to perform the analysis .
This series of protocols (see Section 5), has also been very interesting because
the Maude-NPA had never previously managed API protocols, thus it was also a
challenge to check whether the tool was able to work with such protocols. Note
that the behavior of the tool has been really good, allowing us to implement
and work with it and to check the cryptographic properties we wanted to check
into it.
This work has raised many challenges that have been solved satisfactorily,
such as whether it can be handled the exclusive-or property completely or if it
could work with API protocols using the Maude-NPA tool.
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Appendix A
Never Patterns in CCA-0
Protocol
(S:StrandSet || (e(#0:Key, KM * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (PDK inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(EXP,PDK) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(Km1 * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(Km2 * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(Km3 * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(EXP * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(PDK * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(PIN * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((Km1 * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((Km2 * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((KM * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((KP * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((PDK * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(#0:Key, IMP * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * Km2 * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km2 * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km1 * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KP * KM, Km1 * Km2 * #1:Key)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KP * KM, Km1 * Km2)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KP * KM, Km1 * Km2 * #1:Key)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (Km1 inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (Km2 inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (Km3 inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km2 * #0:Key) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, Km1 * Km2 * #1:Key) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((PIN * EXP) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((EXP * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(#0:Key, #1:Msg)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
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(S:StrandSet || (e(KP * KM, #0:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(#0:Key, null) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(PIN * EXP * Km1 * Km2 * Km3, PDK) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KM, #0:Tipo * #1:EKey) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(null, PDK) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
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Never Patterns for IBM’s
recommendations
(S:StrandSet || (e(#0:Key, KM * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (PDK inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(EXP,PDK) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(Km1 * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(Km2 * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(Km3 * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(EXP * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(PDK * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(PIN * KP * KM,#1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((Km1 * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((Km2 * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((KM * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((KP * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((PDK * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(#0:Key, IMP * #1:Msg) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * Km2 * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km2 * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km1 * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KM, PIN * EXP * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km2 * Km3)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KP * KM, Km1 * Km2 * #1:Key)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KP * KM, Km1 * Km2)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (#0:Msg * e(IMP * KP * KM, Km1 * Km2 * #1:Key)) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge)
(S:StrandSet || (Km1 inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (Km2 inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (Km3 inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, PIN * Km1 * Km2 * #0:Key) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || (e(IMP * KP * KM, Km1 * Km2 * #1:Key) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((PIN * EXP) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
(S:StrandSet || ((EXP * Km3) inI,K:IntruderKnowledge))
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